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Swadesh R. Bose 
This volume is a collection of studies on fiscal and monetary problems 
in Pakistan, published in The Pakistan Development Review over the last few 
years. These studies were done at the Institute in the first half of the 1960's. 
But their relevance and importance for Pakistan's fiscal- and monetary-policy 
problems in relation to economic development has hardly diminished. 
I 
Fiscal policy has a vital role to play in developing countries. For a 
number of reasons, especially the low ratio of saving to national income, 
the state is required to play an active role in promoting economic develop-
ment. The system of planning for development in countries such as Pakis-
tan operates mainly through the price mechanism although direct controls 
are used in certain fields. In view of the inefficiency of increasing direct 
controls, the government has to rely on indirect methods of overall controls 
mainly through fiscal policy and, less importantly, through monetary mea-
sures. When extensive direct controls do not operate, fiscal policy is the 
most powerful instrument which can be used by the government to pro-
mote economic development. 
In addition to influencing allocation of resources, fiscal policy assumes 
importance for the need to raise the rate of domestic saving. Achievement 
of a high ratio of savings to national income by keeping down the consump-
tion of the bulk of the population by an income ^distributive method, i.e., 
by low wages and great incomc inequalities, may not be politically feasible. 
In our times, people may not tolerate a high degree of inequality of income 
and concentration of wealth which may be considered necessary for develop-
ment relying mainly on private enterprise. There may be persistent pressure 
f o r higher wages which is difficult to resist so long as income a n d consump-
tion disparity is enormous and the rich are allowed to indulge in conspicuous 
consumption. As a way out of this dilemma, a policy of large investment 
under public ownership along with private investment seems to be a political 
imperative. Taxation can be used to generate public savings and to raise 
the overall saving ratio without impairing private investment. In this way, 
the sacrifices involved in capital formation can be more equitably distributed 
and hence made more tolerable to the poorer sections of society. If rapid 
economic development and reduction of income inequality arc taken as 
currently accepted social goals, the main objectives of fiscal policy should be 
to raise the rate of investment by restraining consumption, influence the flow 
of resources into socially desirable channels and reduce inequality of incomes 
and wealth. The basic problem then appears to be to design a structure of 
taxation that will be conducive to the attainment of these (or any other) 
objectives which are ultimately related to the accepted social goals. 
A considerable volume of literature on the problems of fiscal policy 
in developing countries has appeared during the post-war years. But 
extensive research on the problems of fiscal policy and taxation in the con-
text of Pakistan's economic development has not been done. The studies 
included in this collection, although not covering a wide range of fiscal-
policy problems, have contributed significantly to Pakistan's economic 
literature in this field. The concern of these studies is with taxation and 
not with expenditure. This collection could be more comprehensive with 
some studies on public expenditure and budgetary policy. This does not, 
however, reduce the value of this collection because, as mentioned earlier, 
the question of an appropriate tax structure has a certain pre-eminence among 
fiscal problems 
Chowdhury's (1963) paper reviews the structure of central taxes and 
their share in Pakistan's national income for the period 1948-62 and offers 
suggestions for mobilizing more public savings through increasing tax 
revenues — direct and indirect taxes including agricultural taxation. 
Chowdhury's (1962) paper examines the efficacy of the tax revenue 
estimating procedure in Pakistan 011 the basis of data for the period 1948-58. 
Reliable estimates of potentially available resources are of great importance in 
economic-development planning since the size and nature of die plan have to 
depend on resources availability. Because of the large size 01 the public-
sector investment in the total development outlay, a reasonably accurate 
estimate of the financial position and prospects of the government is neces-
sary. 
This paper also examines flexibility of Pakistan's tax system in the 
1950's and offers suggestions for increasing the flexibility. Flexibility is an 
important criterion of an efficient tax system. It serves as a built-in stabili-
zer in the economy and can contribute in t h e mobilization of public savings 
in a developing economy since it ensures that as national income increases 
tax revenue increases more than proportionately. The need for increasing 
flexibility is all t h e more important at present when the country is witnessing 
a remarkable increase in agricultural income in West Pakistan, because 
agricultural income still remains outside the coverage of central income tax 
in spite of the recommendations of Pakistan Taxation Enquiry Committee 
of 1960. Introduction of some direct taxation on the agricultural sector and 
making indirect taxation more progressive would be required for improving 
flexibility. The issues raised in the paper remain important for future 
development policy. 
Lewis' (1964) paper raises many issues which, although controversial, 
are relevant and important even to this day. He argues that the emphasis 
on the share of tax in GNP as an indicator of efforts for resource mobiliz-
ation is a narrow view of the fiscal problem and ignores the Central problems 
of fiscal policy in relation to economic development. The effects of the rate 
and structure of taxation go far beyond the amount of revenue raised. For 
example, the structure of taxes directly affects the rate of private domestic 
saving. Also domestic saving and investment are dependent upon the 
method by which imports are allocated — tariffs versus quotas and licensing, 
for example. The level of exports also depends on the rate and structure of 
domestic taxation. In sum, the rates and allocation of domestic saving and 
investment are dependent on the tax and fiscal system not only in a direct 
way through its effects on the post-tax income distribution but also in an 
indirect way through its effects on the level of exports and the level and 
composition of imports. He argues that it is necessary to take these impor-
tant interrelationships into account for a proper evaluation of fiscal-policy 
alternatives. Otherwise, a certain policy measure, while fulfilling one 
particular objective, may create distortions in other respects through its 
effects on other important variables. 
This paper also contains certain specific suggestions for rationalization 
of the fiscal policy. It takes the issue of corporation income tax which has 
been the centre of much controversy in Pakistan. It suggests the rationaliz-
ation of the import-licensing system and a simultaneous reduction of the 
corporate profit-tax rate. The import-licensing system with an overvalued 
exchange rate provides very large profits based on privilege, and then high 
rates of tax are applied to these profits. But, it is argued, if the price of 
imports were raised by a substantial increase in import duties on all items 
or by devaluation and dismantling the direct control regime, the high profit 
based oil privileged position would disappear. If at the same time the 
corporate-tax rate were reduced, this would provide the right type of incen-
tive to the corporate sector without reducing in any way domestic saving 
and investment. 
Lewis' (1965) paper examines certain aspects of fiscal policy along 
with general economic policy during Pakistan's second- and third-five-year-
plan periods. The concern is with taxation and not with expenditure. It 
analyses the taxation measures of the plan period and evaluates them in 
relation to the changes in the overall savings rates, tax ratio, import and 
export ratio. It also analyses the adequacy of the proposed fiscal-policy 
measures for the third-plan period for achieving the domestic savings and 
other targets set in the plan. The analysis is instructive for future planning 
exercises. 
This collection contains three papers on indirect taxes which are 
important tools of differential government policy, such as encouraging or 
discouraging use of particular types of resources and influencing allocation of 
investment resources by the private sector. In the presence of direct controls, 
the determination of the incidence of indirect taxes is, however, very diffi-
cult, and none of the papers investigates into tax incidence. 
Lewis-Qureshi paper analyses some of the major characteristics of 
indirect tax revenue in Pakistan by type of tax and by type of economic flow 
that is taxed, and brings out the major structural changes in tax revenue from 
various industrial commodity groups and change in revenue structure by 
commodities classified by end-use. 
Radhu's (1964.) paper is a companion piece to Lewis-Qureshi paper. 
Apart from the description and analysis of the rate structure of indirect taxes, 
the paper considers the differential incentives provided by indirect taxes, 
and their impact on the allocation of resources and pattern of investment. 
These are important issues for the future as well. Radhu's (1965) paper 
further extends the analysis of the other two papers on indirect taxes, and 
tries to determine the relationship between changes in tax rate and changes 
in prices. Since indirect taxes have been and are going to be important in 
Pakistan's tax structure, this question will remain important in Pakistan's 
development planning in the years to come. 
II 
in developed economies, monetary policy generally means the use 
by the central bank of open-market operations in securities, changes in the 
bank rate, and in the required cash- or liquidity-reserve ratios of the com-
mercial banks. The objective of such monetary policy is to affect the level 
of employment and prices in the desired direction. It is usually recognized, 
however, that such monetary policy is largely irrelevant to an under-
developed economy such as Pakistan's because these traditional monetary-
policy tools are powerless to reverse the basic causes of short-run fluctuations 
of output or prices in such an economy. The problem is not that such 
monetary policy cannot be made effective, but that it requires very drastic 
u s e of t h e policy tools leading to numerous other unacceptable and un-
avoidable consequences to the economy. 
I think that the principal objective of monetary policy in developing 
countries is, or at least should be, to assist the long-run development of the 
economy. Policies concerning money and credit, including measures for 
promotion of growth of financial intermediaries, can affect Pakistan's 
economic development process in many ways. Without going into any 
discussion of the role of money and finance in economic development, two 
issues may be specifically mentioned partly because of their greater impor-
tance in policy debates in recent years: one is the question of the adequate 
supply of money as the economy grows and the other is that of an optimal 
distribution of credit among firms and among regions. The issue of an 
adequate money supply has been recognized for a long time and considerable 
discussion has taken place on the subject particularly since the launching of 
the First Five-Year Plan of Pakistan. Since the publication of the Pakistan 
Credit Enquiry Commission Report, the gross inequality in the distribution 
of credit in favour of the big borrowers has been a matter of public concern. 
In more recent years another dimension has been very forcefully added to 
the problem by the concern about interwing equity and the need for greater 
and easier availability of credit in East Pakistan. 
The articles on monetary problems included in this volume cover 
such areas as the effectiveness of the monetary-policy tools in the Pakistan 
economy, the problems of planning money-supply expansion consistent 
with price stability and the limitations of traditional monetary measures in 
correcting inflationary pressures in a developing but still predominantly 
agrarian economy. 
For the first time in Pakistan, the Bank rate was raised from 3 per cent 
to 4 per cent in January 1959 (later again to 5 per cent in June 1965). Chap-
ra's paper examines how far this first bank-rate change was effective in 
bringing about the desired results. He finds that the expansion of bank 
credit to the private sector declined following the rise in the bank rate but 
this was more than offset by the increase in bank credit to the government 
sector. This was because the State Bank had to accommodate the financial 
needs of the government, and secondly the bank rate was not raised high 
enough for fear of heavily depressing the prices of government securities. 
He concludes, therefore, that the bank rate may be effective if the price of 
government securities is allowed to fall sufficiently and new issues of gover-
ment securities offer a high enough rate of interest to make them attractive 
to scheduled banks. But if the rate of interest is raised on government 
securities, the interest burden of new public debt will rise. This may be an 
important consideration by monetary authorities against using the bank-
rate weapon very drastically along with open-market operations. 
Porter's paper on 'Income Velocity' tries to appraise the usefulness of 
the income-velocity concept or the quantity theory of money as a tool in 
planning expansion of money supply consistent with price stability in a 
developing economy. He recognizes that the quantity theory is applied for 
financial planning in Pakistan not because of its efficiency but for want of 
anything better such as the Keynesian gap analysis which is not feasible due 
to lack of necessary data. His analysis concludes that the use of the quantity 
theory in planning to avoid inflation "is unnecessary, uncertain and mislead-
ing". While his statistical estimates relating movements in real-money 
balances with those in real income gave good fits, he argues that their use for 
prediction purposes is fraught with grave uncertainties. He maintains 
that in Pakistan the supply of money adjusts, at least partially, to its demand 
which may mean that price levels are not determined by the demand for 
money but the reverse. Therefore, it is dangerous to use the quantity theory 
which is based on the assumption of an exogenous money supply and an 
endogenous price level. He suggests that the need to use velocity concepts 
for stabilizing the price level can be successfully avoided through a new 
approach. If stock of foodstuffs can be built up and varying quantities of 
these are released timely the pressures on cereal prices may be avoided, and 
consequently the price level would be reasonably stable. In sum, in the con-
text of the 1960's, he considers money supply as a not-very-important endo-
genous variable and the PL-480 food stockpiles as the primary defence against 
inflation. These ideas may not be readily acceptable to many but they are 
likely to raise questions in all readers about the efficacy of purely monetary 
measures to fight inflation even to-day. 
Porter's food-stockpile idea is further developed in his 1962 paper 
on inflationary implications. Traditional economic theory asserts that while 
a crop failure and a consequent rise in cereal prices may lead to a rise in the 
general price level, if food output is a large proportion of the total, once 
food production attains its former level, other factors remaining unchanged, 
prices will fall to their previous levels. Porter argues that a bad crop in a 
particular year may cause irreversible changes in these "other factors" and 
hence may cause a permanent rise in the general price level. Some of these 
relationships, discussed in the paper, are mere hypotheses not tested empiri-
cally. But in regard to practical policy, the conclusions of his analysis are 
clear enough. Stabilization of food prices is certainly a necessary condition 
for price stability, and very probably a sufficient condition as well. Ade-
quate stocks and stable expanding sources of supply of food stuffs are 
essential " i f Pakistan's development is not to be periodically marred by 
serious rises in prices'. 
Id his 1961 paper on the dangers of monetary policy, Porter again 
argues that an once-and-for-all event — such as a crop failure — m a y p e r -
manently raise the price level. It is usually believed by central bankers and 
many economists that in a situation where prices have already risen f o r 
reasons beyond the central bank's control, the central bank can still force 
prices back to their previous level merely by refusing to increase the money 
supply, but that it does not push the price level down only for fear of unde-
sirable side effects. Porter, however, tries to show in this paper that in 
predominantly agricultural economies, such as Pakistan's, it may be 
impossible to counteract apparently temporary shifts in the price level by 
means of traditional monetary policy and that a higher price level can be 
maintained whether or not the central bank expands the money supply. 
This paper provoked valuable comments from Hugh Patrick and Lester 
Chandler which, alongwith the rejoinder by the author, are included in this 
volume because these are virtually inseparable from Porter's paper and very 
useful in clarifying certain issues, although the commentators were not at 
any time associated with the Institute. 
The articles included in this volume have, I am sure, considerably 
increased our understanding of some of the problems in the monetary field 
which still confront Pakistan. 
Fiscal Problems 
The Weight of Tax Revenue 
in the Pakistan Economy 
A. H. M. Nuruddin Chowdhury 
This chapter originally appeared as an article in the Spring-1963 
issue of The Pakistan Development Review and is the result of research carried 
out in 1963 when the author was a Staff Economist at the Pakistan Institute 
of Development Economics, 
The author is indebted to Dr. John H. Power, a former Research 
Advisor at the Institute, for helpful guidance. Dr. M. Akhalqur Rahman, 
a former Senior Economist, and Dr. Christoph Beringer, a former Research 
Advisor at the Institute, kindly read an earlier draft and made useful 
comments. 
Dr. Chowdhury is at present a Deputy Director (Research) at the 
State Bank of Pakistan. 
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the planned course without excessive reliance on direct controls only if it is 
adequately armed with effective tax powers which can touch any part of 
the economy according to the need of circumstances. Third, built-in 
stabilizers a n d countercyclical tax adjustments can successfully offset fluctuat-
ions in income and employment "where the ratio of taxes to national 
income is high, a large proportion of revenue is from net income taxes and 
there is a large foreign-trade sector subject to ad valorem import and export 
duties" [5, p. 139]. Finally, in the absence of a well-organized capital 
market, a system of government taxing a n d lending can help channel 
savings into development investment. 
The considerations set out in the foregoing passages drive home the 
fact that one of the important fiscal goals of Pakistan should be to enhance 
government's tax revenues. The present low level of tax revenues in 
Pakistan contrasts glaringly with the high level reached even in countries 
at a similar stage of economic development (see, Table III). 
A General Perspective of the Tax System in Pakistan 
In August 1947, Pakistan inherited the tax system developed under 
the British rule in India which was adopted with some modifications. The 
tax system has some important constitutional features. Taxes are levied 
by two levels of governments, at the centre and at the provinces, each 
having well-defined jurisdiction within which to exercise their power to tax1. 
Because of the relative inadequacy of the revenue sources wholly given to 
the provinces, a system of sharing in the proceeds of some important cent-
rally managed taxes has been installed following the recommendation of 
Sir Jeremy Raisman, one-time finance minister of the undivided India. The 
tax powers and the relative shares in the proceeds of the taxes currently 
enjoyed by the central and provincial governments are based, more or less, 
on t-be recommendations contained in the Raismatt Award of 1951 3 . In 
spite of the efforts of this Award to secure an equitable distribution of the 
sources of revenues, the provinces have to rely heavily on central grants-
in-aid often to meet even a part of their current expenditures. Changes 
in this scheme have been made from time to time in deference to the chang-
ing revenue needs of the various governments and the growth and decay of 
the various sources3. 
A summary idea of the tax structure of Pakistan may be obtained 
from Table I which shows the composition of the total tax revenue of 
central and provincial governments. 
1 Local bodies also have minor powers to tax in their limited jurisdiction. 
2For a detailed discussion of the provisions of this Award and the constitutional background 
sre [1, Pp. 109-310]. ' 
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Only in Japan and Indonesia is the proportion of direct taxes more than that 
in Pakistan, as shown in Table IV. Thus, the relative weight of direct taxes 
in Pakistan is high in relation to most of the other Underdeveloped Asian 
countries. The greater weight of indirect taxes in those countries can be 
explained by the much greater importance of foreign trade in most of those 
countries compared to that in Pakistan. The weight of indirect taxes in 
Pakistan is, however, much higher than that in most of the developed coun-
tries. Indirect taxes constitute only around 25 per cent of the total tax 
revenue in the United States and 43 per cent in United Kingdom, though 
in France their share is 67 per cent. 
Another characteristic of the fiscal scene in Pakistan is the ever-widen-
ing gap between government expenditure and tax revenue (see Table V, 
Column (6)). To meet the defence requirements of the country, to defray 
the cost of the civil administration and to finance the developmental pro-
gramme, the government has to spend well near 5 billion rupees. The 
total tax revenue falls far short — less than 2.5 billion (in 1960/61). 
At present, the base of the tax structure remains very narrow. Most 
of the central taxes are confined to the urban and commercial sector of the 
economy. The vast subsistence rural sector lies outside the direct jurisdict-
ion of the central tax authorities. Land revenue and agricultural income 
tax are provincial subjects. For political and administrative reasons, the 
provinces have failed so far to tap these sources adequately. No successful 
drive has been initiated to tax the nonmonetized sector. Even in urban 
and rural monetized sectors, the tax burden has not reached a level commen-
surate with the demands of a development-oriented society. The central 
government has been the main agent so far in the collection of taxes 
in Pakistan. W e shall examine the results of its tclX efforts a little more 
thoroughly in the next few pages. 
The importance of tax revenue can be viewed from several angles. 
In Table V, we present the total centrally collected tax revenues as a per cent 
of three relevant magnitudes: total revenue receipts of the centre, total 
budget expenditure of the centre (capital and current) and total national 
income. In Table VII, we consider the changing weights of the individual 
taxes in the total tax revenue. The period covered is split into two parts, 
namely, pre-Martial-Law (1948-58) and Martial-Law (1958-62). The 
pre-Martial-Law trends are analysed first. 
The Position of Tax Revenues during the Pre-Martial-Law Period, 1948-58 
a) Total tax revenue as per cent of total revenue receipts: Column (5) 
o fTable V shows that prior to Martial Law total tax revenue was diminish-
ing in importance in the total revenue receipts of the central government. 
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natural that a government called upon to meet large developmental expend-
itures is not likely to succeed in raising hundred per cent of its revenue 
requirements from taxes. But 50 per cent or less, on the other hand, in-
dicates a very poor tax effort. Besides, the volume of developmental outlays 
by the government was too low to propel the economy towards sustained 
growth. 
c) Total tax revenue as per cent of national income at current prices: The 
inadequacy of the tax effort in the pre-Martial-Law period appears in sharper 
relief when total tax revenue is viewed as a percentage of national income. 
The average level of taxation compared unfavourably to those reached in 
other 'underdeveloped' countries (see Table III). Table V shows that 
the weight of taxes was not only low but also had a declining trend during 
the period under review. The average weight of tax revenue during last 
four years of the pre-Martial-Law period was less than the average weight 
during the first four years, whereas the aim should have been to increase 
this weight. Even if allowance is made for the high level of tax receipts 
during the Korean boom, the weight of taxes remained rather static. This 
must be considered very disappointing. The 6- to 7-per-cent figure also 
probably overestimates t h e relative tax burden when we consider that the 
national-income figure is believed to be suffering from considerable under-
estimation. Another discouraging aspect of this low weight of taxes is 
that it persisted in spite of the appreciable growth in the more heavily taxed 
sectors. 
d) Relative weight of individual taxes in the total tax revenue: The 
preceding section reveals that the weight of total tax revenue in the national 
income was low and stagnant during the period ending in 1957/58. This 
must have been due to a general inelasticity of the aggregate tax system or 
to changing weights of different taxes, despite an overall elasticity. Table 
VII is designed to show how the weights of individual taxes were changing 
in the aggregate tax revenue. 
Of the five taxes studied, all except the customs gained in weight. 
This is a desirable trend insofar as the tax revenue becomes free from its 
extreme dependence on a single source. But this change in the relative 
weights, it should be noted, is due principally to the decline in customs 
revenue rather than to a high elasticity of the other taxes [4]. Personal 
income tax and excise duty showed steady growth over the period. Sales 
tax became important quite early in the period and remained stable there-
after. Corporation tax increased quite sharply during the first half of the 
period but then declined in relative importance. As for the relative weight 
of total direct taxes, as opposed to the weight of the indirect taxes, the 
situation significantly altered in favour of the direct taxes. Income and 
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corporation taxes constituted 22.5 per cent of the total centrally collected 
tax revenues in 1957/58 as against 10.3 per cent in 1948/49. 
The Position of Tax Revenues during the Martial-Law Period, 1958-62 
The discussion in the preceding section relates to the pre-Martial-
Law period. The Martial-Law period is considered separately to note any 
difference that might have been brought about by the new regime. 
The figures in Tables V and VII, relating to this period, do not show 
any marked deviation from any of the trends indicated earlier. Total tax 
revenue collected by the Centre, viewed as per cent of total national income, 
has been steadily rising since 1957/58 but the 6.9-per-cent figure reached in 
1961/62 still remains below that for 1950-53 or even 1955/56. The magnit-
ude of total tax revenue as per cent of total budgeted expenditure, while 
it has risen since 1957/58, has remained below its average of the pre-Martial-
Law years. This means that though there has been some growth of tax 
revenues, this has been slower than the growth of total budgeted expend-
iture. There has been, however, much greater availability of foreign aid. 
The increased role played by external resources in financing t h e expenditure 
of the government during the Martial-Law period can be seen in Table VIII 
where the total external resources received by the government are presented 
along with the total consolidated capital budget of the central and provincial 
governments for the years 1951/52 to 1961/62. The amount of external 
resources received by the governments during 1948-51 was nil. In the 
very first year of the Martial-Law period, external resources received by the 
government shot up from 6.5 crore to 63.0 crorc rupees, an increase 
of 56.5 crore rupees, while total consolidated capital expenditure increased 
by only 31.3 crore rupees. The reduction of inflationary finance by the 
Martial-Law regime was clearly made possible only by the greater avail 
ability of foreign assistance during this period. 
Revenues have risen significantly only from excise duties and sales 
taxes. The collection from personal income tax momentarily boosted up 
as a result of panic disclosures of hoarded wealth and payments of outstand-
ing arrears, giving an appearance of a break with the past trends. Revenues 
from that source declined, however, after the first year of the Martial-Law 
period. The decline in the weight of customs, witnessed earlier, continued 
in this period as revenues f rom this source failed to grow proportionately. 
In summing up, it may be said that the new regime could not affect 
much of a change-over in fiscal management in spite of its declared intentions 
to follow a policy of paying its way through taxes rather than through 
printing of new money. Lack of success in the fiscal front to mobilize 
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The need for more public saving should not be viewed just as a pre-
text for increasing investment in public sector. In an underdeveloped 
country having no advanced capital market, public saving can serve as a 
substitute for private capital market Private saving may be accruing in 
Pakistan to entrepreneurs engaged in certain lines of industries while the 
social need for new investment lies in other lines of activities with which 
these savers are not familiar or to which they are reluctant to go. The 
government can augment public saving by taxing the high profits earned 
by these entrepreneurs and channel the funds to private investors in other 
fields. 
Second, the concern over incentive to work and efficiency also 
should be viewed in conjunction with the average living standard of the 
country. Any income much above the national average is able to bear 
substantial tax burden without any impairment of the incentive to work or 
of efficiency. The more relevant problem of incentive is one of maintain-
ing proper income differentials between occupations rather than an abso-
lutely high level of disposable income. To the extent that a higher tax 
burden falls on people who are currently performing little economic fun-
ction, taxes can not only succeed in bringing more revenue to public coffers 
but also encourage the supply of economic enterprise. 
Third, indirect taxes can continue to be an effective way of taxing 
the people without seriously offending the principle of equity. Indirect taxes 
have been observed to possess some degree of progressivity in the case of 
underdeveloped countries [7, Vol. I, p. 69]. The consumption pattern in 
these countries is such that the lower the income level the fewer are the 
items of consumption in the family budget over and above the bare necessi-
ties of life which are always either duty-free or lightly taxed. Indirect 
taxes can hit directly at consumption and may be used to provide an equitable 
distribution of sacrifices in consumption between different income groups. 
This equity, rather than the equity in distribution ofincome, is more relevant 
in the developing countries [3, p. 67]. Besides, while worrying about 
equity, the benefits from increased government expenditures must be 
considered. It should also be remembered that the real choice is often 
whether to take away the income by taxes or by printing new money. 
The former is not only more honest but more wise inasmuch as its impact 
can be more accurately predicted. 
Fourth, the problem of administrative limitation is often overstressed. 
Though there is much to be said in favour of simplifying the administration 
of any tax as far as possible, the productivity of the tax should not always 
be sacrificed in order to reduce the administrative burden. Rather attempts 
should be made toward expanding and improving the quality of the tax 
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administration. Development programmes cannot succeed without a devel-
oped tax administration behind them. Expenditure on the education and 
training of tax administrators will fully repay the public treasury. Given 
these changes in the attitude of the tax-planner and in the quality of the tax 
administration, Pakistan can hope to raise 15 to 20 per cent of its national 
income through taxation, a level which has already been achieved by other 
underdeveloped countries (e.g., Burma, Ceylon). 
Some Measures Proposed for Increasing Tax Revenues 
It has been estimated that governments in the underdeveloped count-
ries have to mobilize 20 per cent or more of G N P to meet their capital and 
current expenditure, depending upon the role that government is required 
to play in providing invcstible finance for economic development [10, p. 218] 
, I11 Pakistan, the consolidated revenue budget of the central and provincial 
governments accounted for 10 per cent of national income both in 1960/6.1 
and 1961/62. The consolidated capital budget amounted to another 6 per 
' cent of national income in 1960/61 and 9 per cent in 1961/62, So it appears 
that Pakistan also needs to mobilize in taxes some 20 per cent of G N P to 
finance the government expenditures mainly through taxes and to com-
pensate for low private saving in the economy. This means increasing the 
relative weight of taxes in the national income of Pakistan almost three-fold. 
A very aggressive and well-conceived tax policy is called for to achieve such 
an ambitious target. We shall conclude this paper with some broad suggest-
ions on possible fiscal measures in the context of particular taxes in Pakistan 
and with an appraisal of their revenue prospects. 
Direct Taxes 
Not having a large export sector makes it necessary for Pakistan to 
kO,hc the yields of the direct taxes. Of the direct taxes again, the main em-
phasis has to be on personal income tax and corporation tax. Direct taxes 
on capital and wealth cannot raise a significantly large proportion of national 
income in revenue because Pakistan, an underdeveloped country, is by de-
finition a capital-poor country. Wealth taxes may be levied 011 grounds 
of equity and to check against evasions of the income tax and their yield 
can be increased substantially over their present level. But it is on personal 
A income and corporation taxes tli^t rclisncc must be placed to collect a very 
l i igh proportion of GNP. 
The present coverage and the average rate of personal income tax in 
Pakistan are very inadequate. The number of persons assessed to pay 
income tax is less than .1 per cent in Pakistan whereas it is around 25 per 
cent in the United Kingdom and the United States. Again, persons 
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earning similar levels of income in Pakistan bear a considerably lower tax 
burden compared to their foreign counterparts until they reach very high 
levels of income — this, in spite of the fact that the relative position of the 
persons earning the same income, is much higher in Pakistan. 
The reasons usually given for the narrow coverage and low average 
rate of the personal income tax in poor countries are as follows [10, Pp. 222-
229]. It is thought that the poor countries have to tax relatively more people 
to raise the same proportion of the GNP. The cost of collection is too large 
compar ed to the small collections made from the average assessees. Rates 
on the lower- and middle-income grades have to be moderate because these 
groups bear relatively greater burden of providing for the education of their 
dependents. 
The reasons mentioned above are largely based on some misconcept-
ions and the truth contained in them cannot account for the wide differ-
ences in the burden of income tax between persons in the underdeveloped 
countries and the developed countries. First, inequality of income distri-
bution in Pakistan is perhaps greater than that in many developed countries. 
So Pakistan can raise the same proportion of G N P by taxing relatively fewer 
people. Second, the importance of higher unit cost of collection is often 
exaggerated. L o w average collection is partly matched by the low average 
salary of the tax collectors. This constraint will be further relaxed when 
the average rate of tax is increased. Third, indiscriminate tax concession 
to everybody is not a happy way to provide relief to those who have to pay 
for the heavy educational expenses of their dependents. For this, special 
allowances can be made. But a more effective way to handle this is liberal 
provision of scholarships and subsidized education in socially desirable lines. 
This will, at the same time, reduce the common spectacle of a poor man's 
meritorious ward going without proper education while money is being 
wasted on worthless sons of the well-to-do. Altogether, there seems no 
strong case for not making the coverage and the average rate of personal 
income tax comparable to those in developed countries, but the need for 
doing so is far greater here. 
Indirect Taxes 
The narrow base for many of the direct taxes plus administrative 
limitations in underdeveloped country has made use of indirect taxes 
attractive. Pakistan also cannot neglect this expedient. But, since the 
volume of foreign trade is low, the prospects ofraising more revenue f rom 
export and import duties are dim. Heavier taxes on domestic trade is 
another alternative. 
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We suggest the adoption of a comprehensive sales tax7. For this, 
commodities may be classified under three broad categories. Category 
one would contain the basic necessities which weigh heavily in the average 
family's budget and whose prices must be kept f rom rising, if reasonable 
stability in the cost of living is to be achieved. These would be tax free 
and their supply would have to be expanded to accommodate increased 
demand, if prices are to remain more or less stable. Category two would 
consist of semi-necessities. A moderate sales tax of about the present level 
should be levied on them. Normal elasticities of supply and demand 
should be allowed to determine the equilibrium prices of commodities in 
this group. Category three would cover all luxuries and socially undesir-
able commodities. Prices of these things should be allowed to soar to their 
equilibrium-frec-market level with supply fixed. The sales tax 011 this 
group should be designed to take away all of the excess profit so that there 
is no tendency on the part of private entrepreneurs to expand their supply. 
The actual rate of tax to be charged could be arrived at theoretically f rom 
knowledge of the income and price elasticities of demand for these commo-
dities. The list of commodities in each category should be prepared on the 
assumption of a really tough policy towards consumption, keeping in v iew 
the average level of living in the country. Expansion of the domestic 
market of a commodity in the third category may be allowed only in a case 
where this is necessary for the sound growth of an industry with a big 
export potential8. 
The two taxes dealt with so far touch mostly the industrial-urban 
sector. Because of relatively less monetization in the rural sector and non-
inclusion of agricultural income for the assessment of personal income tax, 
the rural sector of the economy, where the major portion ofnational income 
accrues, remains relatively unscathed by the tax proposals made above. 
Nevertheless, this emphasis on taxing the urban sector has some important 
advantages, First, it favours a high incremental saving ratio as income rises 
more rapidly in the urban sector. Second, insofar as urban consumption 
tends to have a high import content, this will yield more saving on foreign 
exchange. Third, restriction of urban consumption demand, especially of 
luxuries, will force industrial profits to be invested more in capital-goods 
industries as well as in essential consumption-goods industries. 
Agricultural Taxation 
A poor country must look ultimately to its agriculture, however, for 
the economic surplus necessary to finance development. Here is where 
7 " I f an underdeveloped country needs to raise some 15 to 20 per cent of G N P in revenue 
and cannot rely heavily on a large yield from taxing foreign trade, the adoption of some form of a sales 
tax is inevitable" [10, p. 227]. 
8This scheme for a sales tax for Pakistan follows suggestion made by Dr. John H. Power, a 
former Research Adviser at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. 
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most of the national income is generated and here is where the labour supply 
for industrialization largely originates. The growth of the industrial labour 
forces must be matched, at least in part, by a f low of saving f rom agriculture. 
At present, a sizeable transfer occurs through the maintenance of adverse 
terms of trade for agriculture and the overvaluation of the rupee. But at 
the same time, agricultural taxation has lagged and failed to mobilize 
fully the economic surplus which is being augmented by agricultural 
improvements and overhead investments undertaken by the government. 
Moreover, adverse terms of trade tend to discourage production and 
encourage consumption of agricultural output in rural areas, while it is the 
reverse that is needed. In short, there is a greater role for tax policy to 
play in mobilizing agricultural resources for development. 
Clearly, a greater contribution f rom agriculture depends primarily 
on increased output. This, in turn, may require rather fundamental changes 
in the organization of agriculture. While extreme measures like collect-
ivization of agriculture are detested in our country, a reorganization of our 
agriculture 011 the generally approved principles of cooperation should be 
feasible9. This could be highly rewarding from the point of v iew of both 
resource mobilization and productive efficiency. The energies of all the 
government and government-sponsored agencies currently engaged in 
agriculture might be joined into one comprehensive agency to make this 
change-over successful. 
Until such a thorough-going solution is possible, attention should be 
concentrated on removing the slack in the taxation of agriculture. The 
primary emphasis should be on land taxation, since by increasing the cash 
needs of the farmers and penalizing unproductive use of land, both product-
ion and marketing are encouraged. In addition, means must be found for 
implementing income taxation in agriculture to curb the consumption of 
the high-income recipients. 
The measures suggested above are subject to stupendous political and 
administrative constraints. The author has no illusions in this respect. The 
measures are not tipped because the political and administrative matrix is 
all set for them. This paper is an attempt to show the leeway in the fiscal 
front, the magnitude of the tax efforts we need to make and the possible 
directions and emphasis of the tax policies. Once these are found convinc-
ing, the constraints may start loosening. It may come to be considered 
worthwhile to build up a tax administration which is more business-like, 
9 A case for cooperative farming in India is presented in [8, p. 140]. The prospects of cooperative 
methods in the Pakistan agriculture are highlighted by the success recently achieved in a rural cooperative 
pilot experiment conducted at Comilla Thana, East Pakistan, under the auspices of the East Pakistan 
Academy for Village Development, Comilla. 
24 Studies on Fiscal and Monetary Problems 
has different emphasis on the qualifications of its personnel and is subject 
to a separate discipline. A political elite having mass support may identify 
itself with the cause of rapid economic development. It may agree to make 
sacrifices and dare to offend interested groups who have to be hurt in the 
short run. Again, all these may have to be preceded by the generation of 
that 'popular enthusiasm' which has been termed by Professor Lewis as 
"both" the lubricating oil of planning, and the petrol of economic 
development" [9, p. 128]. 
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The Predictability and the Flexibility 
of Tax Revenues in Pakistan 
A.H.M. Nuruddin Chowdhury 
Evolving an efficient tax system is a major concern in any developing 
country, because the pace and viability of development programmes depend 
heavily on the tax system. An efficient tax system should satisfy tests on 
many counts. This paper analyses two aspects of Pakistan's tax structure, 
namely, its predictability and its flexibility. In Section I, the efficacy of the 
revenue estimating procedures in Pakistan is analysed. Section II contains 
a discussion on the flexibility of the central tax revenues with respect to 
changes in the national output. 
I. PREDICTABILITY 
Importance of Revenue Estimates 
In planning for economic development the task of estimating potent-
ially available resources in advance has assumed increased importance for on 
this depends the size and nature of the development plan which can be 
undertaken. Since the government is the principal agent in the develop-
ment programmes of most countries, it is necessary that it make fairly 
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accurate assessment of its financial position and prospects. Errors both of 
underestimating and of overestimating the revenues of the government will 
be prejudicial to economic planning. When the government underestimates 
its resources, its development programme will aim too low, whereas the 
opposite error will lead to adoption of unrealistic targets. The adminis-
tration suffers from wastage, complacency and inefficiency in the first case 
and from anxiety, friction and frustration in the second. 
In budgeting also, estimates of revenues are relevant in several ways. 
Firstly, revenue estimates of at least a rough and broad nature are necessary 
at the very outset of the budgetary process to guide the initial fiscal decisions 
concerning the general outline of the expenditure targets of the government. 
Secondly, a more firm, final estimate of revenue is needed in the summary 
budget statement to support new proposals for changes in taxes. Third, 
estimates are required by the legislature or appropriation committees at the 
time of reviewing the expenditure estimates. And fourth, revenue estimates 
help the execution process. As the execution process advances, the respons-
ible authorities may modify the plans according to the changed prospects of 
revenue that subsequent re-estimates may reveal. They also can rationally 
plan the cash requirements and intra-year borrowing if they can anticipate 
the seasonal variations in receipts fairly well [3, Pp. 380-381]. 
These considerations justify greater efforts to assess the quality of 
existing procedures for estimating revenues in Pakistan and to point out if 
and where change is needed. 
A monograph of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics 
points out that the budget estimates of revenues and the actual receipts vary 
widely [ 1 1 , Pp. 7-19]. The purpose of this section is to assess the budget esti-
mating procedures and results in Pakistan in the context of individual taxes. 
Procedure for Preparing Revenue Estimates 
In the studies of fiscal discipline of government all over the world, 
expenditure estimates rather than revenue estimates have received greater 
attention from both academicians and budget-makers. A survey of the 
procedures followed by the estimators of revenue will reveal three principal 
types: the rule of the penultimate year, the method of averages, and direct 
valuation [2, Pp. 175-179]. 
According to the rule of the penultimate year and the method of 
averages, estimates of revenue are prepared on the basis of past collections 
without adjustments for any predictable changes in the future. Such esti-
mates will lag behind actual receipts in a growing economy and thus cause 
unnecessary inaccuracy in government plans. To avoid this fault, methods 
of direct valuation have recently been adopted by many governments. The 
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technique involves the collection of statistical material concerning factors 
which affect the revenue proceeds. Then, through statistical analysis and 
projections, future revenues are forecast directly rather than by extra-
polations. The revenue estimates of the British Treasury, which follows 
this technique, have a high reputation for accuracy. 
The Organizational Framework in Pakistan 
In Pakistan there is no admitted reliance on extrapolation in estimating 
future revenues. Following the British traditions, a method in the nature of 
direct valuation is used. But the valuation process lacks much of the 
rigour that such a technique demands. 
Those agencies responsible for collection of revenues also prepare the 
original revenue estimates1. At the head of the estimating organization is 
the Budget and Expenditure Division of the Ministry of Finance. As the 
body ultimately responsible for the task, it sets the time table to be followed 
by various agencies and sends out special instructions2. In conformity with 
these instructions and time schedule, the estimates are built up from the 
bottom. 
The estimates originate in the hands of the lowest officers responsible 
for collection in the various agencies: an Income Tax Officer, an Assistant 
Collector of Customs, an Assistant Collector of Excise or a Superintendent 
of Excise, as the case may be. They prepare the estimates on the basis of 
their records of past collections and current assessments and their subjective 
appraisal of future prospects3. These are then revised by the heads of the 
collecting agencies. 
The collecting agencies submit their original estimates along with 
data for actual collections during three preceding years to the Central Board 
of Revenue (CBR) . (In the case of nontax revenue, the estimates go to the 
parent ministries.) The C B R frames the final estimates of all tax revenues 
by scrutinizing, collating and integrating the original estimates. This 
scrutiny is not very serious in the case of personal income taxand corpotration 
tax. The original estimates of these two taxes are more or less main ained 
because the collecting officials are assumed to know best the relevantfacts 
But the estimates of customs, sales and excise taxes are often drastically 
changed on the basis of government import policy, etc., which are to some 
extent known to the Board and of which the collecting agencies are likely to 
be ignorant. After being processed and checked in this way, the estimates 
IThis practice is followed in most countries, especially in the United Kingdom, and is not pec-
uliar to Pakistan. 
2The "Time Table" contains the deadline dates by which the revenue estimates must reach different 
points in the administrative hierarchy. The special instructions are more or less in the form of exhort-
ations for showing drive and efficiency in collections. 
3But the estimates seem to be greatly influenced by last year's actual collection. (see Appendix C ) . 
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take final shape and are submitted to the Budget and Expenditure Division. 
This is the final reviewing authority and it can alter the estimates in any way 
it likes, though in actual practice changes are made in consultation with 
the Board. 
Thus, the estimates which originate at a low administrative level in 
the hands of people who have but a rudimentary statistical sense undergo 
a long chain of subsequent reviews. But at no stage does the reviewing 
procedure make use of much sophisticated technique. It is often a crude 
guess rather than a factual basis on which the reviewers raise or lower the 
original estimates. It is possible that the final estimates are less accurate 
than those which would be achieved if the original estimates were not 
tampered with. 
The accuracy of these final estimates should, however, be judged in 
the perspective of the amount of prediction involved in the preparation of 
those estimates. The element of forecasting involved in the tax structure is 
reduced by two important factors. First, the system is so designed that the 
tax bases are fairly well known in some cases at the time of preparing the 
estimates. And second, the tax bases are often under the control of planned 
policy decisions and do not change much as a result of erratic, unpredictable 
movements in the economy. But the task of prediction is made more 
difficult by the introduction of new taxes and frequent changes in the rates 
and coverage of old ones. 
The Budget Estimates for the next fiscal year and the Revised 
Estimates for the current year are completed after more than ten months of 
the current fiscal year have already passed. So, in the case of the Revised 
Estimates, information about the actual collection of ten months is available 
at the time of preparing the final (Revised) estimates. Telegraphic figures 
give the approximate position of the eleventh month as well4. Thus, the 
errors in the Revised Estimates should be attributable to the unknown 
factors of two months at most. On the other hand, the Budget Estimates 
are prepared fourteen months in advance and cover a period of twelve months 
in the future. But many factors affecting the tax revenues operate with a 
lag and are to that extent known to the estimators5. In the case of per-
sonal income tax and corporation tax, the total income assessed during ten 
months (possibly eleven) out of twelve months is known at the time of 
preparing the Budget Estimates. These features, it would appear, render 
the task of revenue estimation rather simple, and one would expect a fairly 
high standard of accuracy. We shall now turn to an examination of this. 
^Revised estimates of revenues are submitted quarterly on the basis of actual collections. Besides 
this, the collecting agencies send postal figures for the tenth month and telegraphic figures for the 
eleventh month. 
5The effects of new taxes which will be introduced during the year are considered by the Budget 
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al income at current prices, the first of the difficulties is partly overcome 14. 
The second difficulty can be removed if hypothetical tax-yields can be cal-
culated by keeping the tax rates equal to that of a particular base year 
[ i , P p . 1 7 1 - 1 8 3 ; 4]. 
In this paper, no adjustments are made for differences in tax rates and 
tax exemption limits to make the work less arduous. The gross elasticities 
are qualified for the effects of changes in rates, exemption limits and quality 
of tax administration wherever possible. 
Finally, the tax structure is a complex of many taxes of diverse nature. 
Change in national income will affect the yield of various taxes in a dis-
similar manner. The effects of price changes and the nature of rates applied 
on different taxes are also varied. A flat rate ad valorem tax, a specific duty 
or a progressive rate schedule will make a tax-yield react differently to chan-
ges in national income. These considerations make a separate study of the 
flexibility of individual taxes necessary, especially if the separate effects of 
changes in levels of the rates and the national income are to be noted. The 
five major central taxes have been selected for study. Since they constitute 
almost the entire tax revenue 15, this study will reveal the sensitivity of the 
total tax structure as well. The elasticity of the total tax revenue to income 
iss also separately obtained. 
The elasticities of different taxes, f rom year to year, with respect to 
national income at current prices are shown in Table IV. 
The year-to-year changes in tax-yield do not show very uniform 
relationship to changes in income. The randomness may be due to a 
number of reasons and it is difficult to trace out the exact causes of every 
movement. First, the movements of different components of national 
income such as agricultural production, industrial production and levels 
of exports and imports may not be always in sympathy with changes in 
national income from year ro year. Second, changes in the rate structure 
and expansion or contraction of the statutory limits of tax bases also modify 
the effects of changes in national income on the tax-yield. Third, the corres-
pondence of tax-yields to national income may also be distorted by an alleged 
policy of tax collection in good years in order to create a reserve of arrears 
to draw upon during later lean years (as a result the tax-yield does not 
change by as much as it should in response to a change in national income). 
Finally, the national-income figures used are likely to suffer f rom much 
error of its own. 
14The use of current-price national income does not take account of the effects of price change 
on tax yield ria possible changes in demand of the taxed commodities induced by the price change. 
15In 1949/50, they formed 78.2 per cent of the total revenue and95.2 per cent of the total tax 
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industry, the elasticity of excise duty to national income will remain high. 
It will be required to compensate the loss on import duties with the growth 
of import-substituting industries within the country. 
P e r s o n s ! I n c o m e T a x 
This is the most important of the direct taxes and has, in Pakistan, a 
progressive schedule of rates. Over the period 1948-58, the yield from this 
source is secularly increasing with the exception of 1953/54 and 1955/56. 
During these two years, yields from personal income tax were lower by 13 
and 8 per cent of their respective preceding year's collection. The post-
Korean business recession in 1952/53 and the adverse effects of low agricul-
tural prices in 1954/55 probably explain the exceptions16. 
The total collection of personal income tax in 1957/58 was more 
than 3.5 times the 1948/49 collection. If we consider 1949/50 level17 for 
comparison, the increment is still more than one hundred per cent ( 1 1 3 . 1 
per cent). This set against the increase in national income by 38.7 per cent 
gives the elasticity of personal income tax as 2.9 (Table V). Alternatively, 
the elasticity becomes 6.3 if we take the change of average yield and national 
income between the two periods, 1949-53 and 1953-57. 
Even the elasticity of 2.9 must be viewed with qualification. This 
sensitiveness cannot be considered as an automatic response to national 
income. Since the disruption of Partition, the quality of tax administration 
has improved. Furthermore, personal income tax depends mostly upon 
the faster growing nonagricultural sector18. If adjusted for these factors, 
the elasticity would be much lower. Consider the contributions of man-
ufacturing, government, services and wholesale and retail trade as the relevant 
elasticity denominator; these have increased in real terms by 47.5 per cent 
between 1949/50 and 1957/58. Adjusting for an assumed 20-per-cent rise 
in lie general price level, we get an increase for these sectors of 77 per cent 
in current prices. O11 the other hand, if we attribute 20 per cent of the 
increase in tax collection from this source to an improvement in the quality 
of the tax administration, the elasticity of he income tax to change in the 
above mentioned base becomes only slightly greater than unity. 
16Though agriculture is outside the domain of personal income tax, a huge drop or rise in agri-
cultural prices affects the income in other sectors as well and thus influences the yield of income tax in-
directly. 
171948/49 was the year immediately after Partition. The poor collection in that year is partially 
due to the fact that the administrative set-up had not been put in good shape by then. The colled ions of 
income tax nearly doubled next year, though the exemption limit was raised from 2,500 to 3,000 rupees. 
ISAgriculture is outside thejurisdiction of central taxation by constitutional provisions. 
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This rather poor performance of the only progressive tax may be 
ascribed to several factors. The exemption limit of personal income tax 
was raised from 3,000 rupees in 1949/50 to 5,000 rupees in 1957/58. The 
level of tax rates was slightly lower in 1957/ 58 than that of 1949/50. More-
over, the proportion of total income assessed had declined in the highest 
income grade (40,000 rupees per annum and over) and had increased in the 
middle and lower grades19. 
The effects of differences in the tax rates and in the exemption limits 
can be eliminated by choosing pairs of years with identical tax rates and 
exemption limits. Table VI shows three such cases20. 
T A B L E V I 
Elasticity 
(1) Between 1952/53 and 1953/54 • • • • —2-9 
(2) Between 1954/55 and 1955/56 .. .. 0.7 
(3) Between 1955/56 and 1956/57 .. .. 1 .2 
The elasticities in Table VI do not behave uniformly. But they are low on 
the average. 
Another pertinent measure of the elasticity of personal income tax 
may be with respect to change in total income assessed. Between 1949/50 
and 1955/56, total income assessed increased by 20.1 per cent (from 51,63 
lac rupees to 61,97 lac rupees) while, income tax receipts increased by 66 per 
cent. The elasticity becomes 3.3. During the same period, the current-
price national income has risen by 7.5 per cent only. This corroborates 
the fact that growth in the sector covered by personal income tax is higher 
than the growth in the overall economy and that substantial amount of the 
early increase in tax yields is due to an improved collection machinery. 
The elasticity of 3.3 with respect to change in income assessed has to be 
ascribed to either the progressivity of the tax schedule or a higher level of 
tax rates or to both. Since the rates in 1955/56 are actually lower compared 
to those in 1949/50, this indicates a high elasticity of the average rate of 
personal income tax to a change in its base. 
19Be tween 1949/50 and 1955/56, total income assessed in t he 0-9999 rupees income g r a d e 
increased f r o m 24 t o 27 p e r c e n t ; tha t in t h e 10,000-39,999 r upees i n c o m e g rade it increased f r o m 29 t o 3 1 
p e r cen t , a n d t h a t in t h e 40,000 rupees-and-over i n c o m e g r a d e it decreased f r o m 47 t o 42 p e r cen t . 
ZOThe elast ici ty b e t w e e n 1949/50 a n d 1950/51, t h e o n l y o t h e r such case, c a n n o t b e o b t a i n e d as n o 
e s t i m a t e o f na t i ona l i n c o m e f o r 1948/49 exists. 
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To conclude, d i e yield from personal income tax has increased sub-
stantially during 1948/49 to 1957/58. But considering the much higher rate 
of growth in the sectors covered by income tax, the progressivity in its rate 
structure and the efforts to improve the collection machinery, the increase 
in yield must be regarded as low. The low elasticity is observed even when 
years with identical tax rates a r e considered. This suggests that total income 
assessed to income tax has been inelastic compared to the growth in taxable 
income. The huge declarations of some of the unreported wealth after 
martial l a w corroborates this. 
Corporation Tax 
Corporation tax is levied on the income of all registered companies 
at a flat rate of 56.25 per cent. Though this is often lumped with personal 
income tax, it merits separate consideration on account of the dissimilar 
nature of its base and rate schedule. From a very insignificant initial weight, 
the corporation tax has increased rapidly during the later years. Table V 
gives the elasticity of corporation tax to national income as 19.7 and 16.9. 
The first two years' corporation tax receipts are abnormally low compared 
to the receipts of the later years. This is due to both the low level of rates 
and the poverty of large-scale manufacturing during these years. If we 
leave out the two extreme pairs of years, 1948-50 and 1949-51, between 
which the receipts almost trebled every year (see Appendix D), the elasticity 
of corporation tax to national income becomes much lower. Between 
1950/51 and 1956/5721 it amounts to 2.6 and between 1950/51 and 1957/5822 
it amounts to 5.9. 
The elasticity of corporation tax receipts to the growth of large-scale 
manufacturing is more modest. Between 1949/50 and 1957/58, the index 
of large-scale manufacturing (at constant prices) rose by 444.8 per cent and 
763.1 per cent more was added to corporation tax receipts. If we exclude 
the extreme years and consider the period with identical tax rates (1950-57), 
the tax receipts increased by 98.5 per cent in response to a change of 310.9 
per cent in the index of largc-scale manufacturing. The elasticity becomes 
as low as 0.3. The elasticity will be even lower if effects of price changes are 
considered. This low elasticity with respect to index of large-scale man-
ufacturing is due in part to the fact that the coverage of corporation tax is not 
coterminous with large-scale manufacturing. Besides, very liberal exempt-
ions allowed to industries have kept the yield, from this source, low23 . 
21The rate of corporation tax was identical during this period. 
22The rate of corporation tax applied on corporate income exceeding 25,000 rupees was raised 
O} 62.50 per cent in 1957/58. 
23Many newly established concerns enjoy a tax-holiday during the initial years. They can charge 
high depreciation allowances on machineries and, thus, reduce the taxable profit. Profits ploughed back 
also get exemption. 
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Sales Tax 
After customs, sales tax is the most important source of central 
government revenue. The index of sales tax receipts increased by 247.6 
per cent between 1948/49 and 1957/58. Even if the extreme year 1948/49 is 
excluded, the increase is 68.9 per cent. Table V shows 2.3 and 1.6 as elas-
ticities of sales tax receipts to national income. Enhancement of the rate 
schedule and coverage contributed to t h e improvement of sales t a x receipts 
during this period. 
The elasticity of sales tax of national income seems to be low on the 
evidence of recent years. In 1951/52, sales tax receipts reached a peak due to 
liberal imports and the impact of the new Sales Tax Act of 1951 . Since 
then, the receipts remained below this level through 1956/5724. Only in 
1957(58 was the level of 1951/52 finally surpassed. Again, the elasticity of 
sales tax to the index of manufacturing between 1950/51 and 1957/58 is only 
0.3. The failure of revenue from sales tax to increase during the later years 
is partly due to the raising of exemption limits from 15,000 rupees in 1951/52 
to 60,000 rupees in 1954/55. 
Next, we list in Table VII elasticity of sales tax to national income 
between pairs of years with same exemption limit and rates: 
T A B L E VII 
Elasticity 
(1) Between 1952/53 and 1953/54 • • •• 5-1 
(2) Between 1954/55 and 1955/56 .. .. 1 .6 
(3) Between 1955/56 and 1956/57 .. .. 0.1 
(4) Between 1956/57 and 1957/58 .. . * —9.9 
(5) Between 1954/55 and 1957/58 .. .. 0.87 
In Table VII, case (1) may suggest that sales tax has a high positive elasticity 
to a fall in national income, given the identical rate and exemption limit. 
However, case (4) does not confirm the same. The fall in national income in 
case (1) is accompanied by a sharp decline in the total volume of exports and 
24This is so despite the fact that the index of national income at current prices is 29.5 per cent 
higher in 1956/57 than in 1951/52. The collection in 1951/52 was abnormal. A new sales tax act was 
introduced that year and all the existing stocks were assessed under the old tax. 

Chowdhury: Predictability and Flexibility of Tax Revenues 49 
Measures for Increasing the Flexibility of Tax Revenues 
The inflexibility of tax revenues noted above is a product of both 
faulty mechanics of the tax structure and weakness in its administration. 
Overdependence on customs has kept the tax system tied to a stagnant source. 
Specific nature of many taxes has made their yields unresponsive to the 
significant price rises that took place in the economy. Besides, inadequate 
coverage, loopholes in the design of the rate schedules, indiscriminate 
exemptions and, finally, outright evasions have militated against the operat-
ion of any built-in flexibility. 
To restore flexibility actions are required to mitigate all these defects. 
First, there should be a shift of emphasis from customs to other sources. 
Though import and export duties must continue to serve the purpose they 
are currently doing, efforts should be directed, more and more, to make the 
fast and sturdily growing sectors contribute to tax revenues proportionately. 
Second, there should be a change over to ad valorem duties as opposed to 
specific duties wherever feasible. Third, the weight and scope of the direct 
taxes and of the progressive taxes should be increased. Fourth, the time lag 
between earning of incomes and payment of taxes should be reduced. 
Finally, dependence on built-in flexibility alone is not enough. Increasing 
resort to what is known as the policy flexibility is necessary. There should 
be deliberate legislation of tax measures which will take note of the changing 
pattern of relative price movements and of relative growth rates among 
various sectors. The case of several upward revisions of lower exemption 
limit of personal income tax in Pakistan is an example of actions taken against 
the dictate of this policy flexibility. Such things should be discontinued. 
Thus, only a synchronized course of action, both at policy and execution 
levels, can give the system enough flexibility in order to contribute to the 
emergence of a productive tax system in Pakistan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan is now widely regarded as a successful case of movement 
towards self-sustaining economic growth. If one lets it become known that 
he has spent some time in Pakistan, other economists immediately want to 
know: What happened? What were the "real" causes? Is the success a 
mirage? H o w long will it last? An attitude of enthusiasm is a sharp 
contrast to the air of pessimism and prevailed as recently as two years ago. 
The notes here are not an attempt to establish what has happened to Pakistan's 
economy, or why it happened now and not five years ago. The aim is 
much more modest, but may have some bearing on the larger question. 
My primary interest is in examining certain aspects of government policy in 
general and fiscal policy in particular, excluding policy on government 
expenditures. I shall not be concerned with Plan allocations and govern-
ment outlays. 
In the macroeconomic framework of Pakistan's plans, present invest-
ment is the only determinant of future output. The problem of "mobiliz-
ing" resources is one of finding offsets to investment expenditure from either 
domestic or foreign sources. The Third Plan states that "the main task in the 
Perspective Plan will be to institutionalise the growth process and to finance 
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income generated during the Plan period [15, Chapter V, para 5]1. 
The balance of payments projections and the numerous explicit and 
implicit policies on which they depend, constitute one of the most 
crucial elements of the Third Plan [15, Chapter VI, JpctlTct II. 
Despite the "critical" or "crucial" role played by the projections of 
saving, imports and exports for the implicit third-plan model, these project-
ions, particularly of saving, have less basis in detailed empirical analysis 
than the key programmes in specific sectors, such as agriculture or man-
ufacturing industry. One of the curious and interesting features of the 
second-plan period is the relatively smooth behaviour of most important 
aggregates on a year-to-year basis. This phenomenon is called a "firmness 
in the growth rate" in Planning-Commission publications and, while one 
hopes it will continue, one should not forget: i) that 1962/63 was the only 
year of the five during the Plan that saw any severe downward fluctuations 
in agricultural output due to weather; and ii) that there was a continual rise 
in the aid-financed current-account deficit in the balance of payments and in 
imports. A combination of good luck and good management produced 
extremely uniform growth beginning in 1959/60. I think it is fair to say 
that such behaviour of aggregate statistics is unusual and that one must be 
exceedingly careful in drawing conclusions that are too strong on the basis 
of four or five years' experience. 
To illustrate the need for care in choosing benchmarks or in fixing 
coefficients, I have recalculated some of the average and marginal rates of 
saving and taxation for the past and those projected for the future to com-
pare the conclusions drawn from the most recent five years taken alone 
with those drawn from other bases. I have tried hard to get figures com-
parable to those used in the Planning-Commission documents, though this 
is extremely difficult for a number of reasons2. The exercise follows in the 
next three subsections. 
IThe Evaluation Report says that 22 per cent was chosen because it was the "trend in the marginal 
rate of savings over the entire [Second] Plan period" [13, p. 7]. It is not clear f rom the Evaluation 
Report whether this statement means the M R S is the ratio of the differences in the trend values of saving 
and income f rom 1959/60 to 1964/65 or the trend value of annual marginal rates of saving or something 
else. The reader should note that Third Plan or Second Plan when italicized refers to the document, 
rather than this Plan period. 
2The concept of investment differs f rom that of development expenditure: there are larger and 
unexplained differences in the figures f rom the Evaluation Report [13] published in March 1965 and the 
Third Plan [15] published in May 1965, for several key items; sometimes current prices are used, sometimes 
constant prices, and only occasionally is the source of the deflator given; the changed procedure for estimat-
ing imports, investment, G N P (and, therefore, saving and saving ratios) is not explained for the early 
years covered in Chapter I of the Third Plan "Review of Planned Development"; Indus Basin imports and 
investment, and PL-480 imports are included in some places and excluded in others. One could go on , 
I have attached an Appendix for those who are interested in a brief introduction to problems of using 
the available historical statistics in Pakistan. 
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while here there is a rise3. The saving figure given in the Third Plan for 
1959/60 is lower than that in the Evaluation Report [13] but the difference 
is unexplained. The lower third-plan estimate of 1959/60 saving means a 
lower marginal rate from 1954/55 to 1959/60 and a higher marginal rate of 
saving f rom 1959/60 to 1964/65 than shown here. 
The principal differences among various average and marginal 
saving figures, however, come from an examination of the average rates of 
saving over the entire Plan periods and the marginal rates between Plan 
periods, as shown in the lower panel of Table I4. Here one sees that the 
M R S from the first- to the second-plan period was not 22 per cent but less 
than 13 per cent, and that the marginal rate from the second- to the third-
plan period is, again, not 22 per cent but 26 per cent. It is of course very 
easy to say the difference is due to the fact that there is an acceleration of the 
growth rate and the saving rate and, therefore, calculations made by taking 
averages will give different results than those made by taking end points, 
which is true enough. The problem is, however, first, that we are presum-
ably dealing with a real economy, not with a mathematical function, and 
second, that the very acceleration in growth rates of GNP, investment and, 
particularly, imports that took place between 1959/60 and 1964/65 probably 
had an effect on the rate of saving that will not be repeated when the growth 
rates of these variables level out, as they are in fact expected to do in the 
third-plan period. Thus, the choice of a 22-per-cent M R S for the Third 
Plan is, in an important sense, not a continuation of past performance. The 
somewhat arbitrary choice of the value of "the critical assumption" is not 
in keeping with the high levels of analytical ability and sophistication that 
have come more and more to characterize the work of the Planning C o m -
mission. The disregard for any kind of "saving function" when much 
of the rest of the aggregate framework of the plan is apparently based on 
fairly complex functional relationship is quite distressing. There is no way 
of truly evaluating whether the saving goal is too high, given the economic 
relationships and behaviour of various sectors of the economy, or whether 
it is too low. But the assumed goal is not, as is stated, simply that things will 
continue as they have been going. 
Unfortunately, there exists at present no comprehensive study of 
saving in the economy by sectors. Aggregate domestic saving is computed 
by deducting some measure of the balance-of-payments deficit (the one 
chosen varies f rom time to time) from the estimated level of gross invest-
ment (the estimates of which change from time to time). Some preliminary 
estimates of noncorporate private saving were made two years ago by the 
3The third-plan figures are in constant prices, mine are in current prices. For a discussion of cur-
rent and constant-price investment and saving estimates, see Appendix. 
4The reader should refer to Table 1 footnote and to the Appendix for the sources and procedure* 
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In Table III, I have given the annual figures for total and for public 
a n d private saving as well as some average and marginal rates of total and 
private saving for the period 1959/60 to 1964/65. Despite the danger of 
looking at short time periods, it is interesting to note that the rate of private 
saving (GPDS) out of gross disposable national income (GDNI) has remained 
virtually constant for the past three years despite the rapid growth of 
imports, industrial production and agricultural output. Looking at the 
marginal rates from the first three years to the last three years, one sees again 
that the private rate is below the total rate due to the rapid growth of public 
saving over the past five years. The marginal rates from 1959-61 to 1961-63 
are much higher than those from 1961-63 to 1963-65. These figures point 
up again the fairly substantial difference between the first three years and the 
last three years of the six presented or, if one likes, between the first two 
a n d the last three years of the Second Plan. It is not at all clear which of the 
variety of "marginal rates of saving" is the appropriate one to use for 
projections into the next five years6-. 
Tax Ratios 
While government policy cannot specify what the rate of saving out 
of income will be, it can have a good deal of influence on saving rates through 
adjustments in taxation and in public saving. On the matter of taxation, the 
government of Pakistan deserves high marks for its aggregate performance 
over the past five years, as opposed to the fairly poor performance of tax 
revenue during the first-plan period. Table IV represents the relevant 
aggregate figures. The behaviour of the average of marginal ratios of t a x 
and total revenue to G N P presents a marked contrast to those of the saving 
ratios. Both the M R S and t h e marginal rate of taxation ( M R T ) are low 
when measured f rom 1954/55 to 1959/60, and both are much higher over 
the years from 1959/60 to 1964/65. The difference in the behaviour of the 
M R S and M R T is in the projections for the third-plan period. Looking 
6There is a troublesome point related to estimates of public saving and to government revenue for 
the Second Plan, particularly 1964/65. The figures for tax and nontax revenue and for total current 
expenditure for 1964/65 differ greatly between the Evaluation Report of March 1965 and the Third Plan 
of May 1965 with the result that the public-saving figure for 1964/65 in the Evaluation Report is 290 million 
rupees smaller than that given in the Third Plan: expenditures arc lower by 564 million rupees and revenue 
by only 274 million rupees. Total saving for 1964/65 is the same in both documents, however, so that 
the estimate for 1964/65 private saving is 290 million rupees lower in the Third Plan than in the Evaluation 
Report which, if true, would make the private-saving ratio lower in 1964/65 than in 1963/64. Such a conclu-
sion is difficult to explain if the impact of import liberalization on private incomes in the industrial sector 
was as great as it was expected to be. More problematic in some ways is that the estimate for public saving 
or revenue surplus for the whole second-plan period is unchanged from the Evaluation Report to the Third 
Plan. There must, therefore, have been an equal but offsetting decrease in the estimate of public saving 
for earlier years which implies in turn an upward adjustment of the private-saving amounts and ratios for 
earlier years and a larger fall in the ratio of private saving to disposable national income in 1964/65. These 
points cannot be cleared up since the Third Plan does not give the surplus or saving estimates for the earlier 
years of the Second Plan. The problem of discovering a stable relationship of saving to income in total 
or by sectors becomes even more difficult. 
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down the tax and public-saving efforts that were accelerated over the second-
plan period, the private sector received, as a residual, a very steep accelerat-
ion of projected performance in the third-plan period. If there is anything 
at all significant about the stability of the private M R S over the past three 
years accompanied by large increases in private-sector incomes, the implicit 
M R S of the private sector in the Third Plan may be unrealistically high for 
the third-plan period, even under the "high-tax" assumption. 
The line of criticism or comment, spelled out above, does not mean 
that I favour lowering Pakistan's sights for the third-plan period. What 
I have tried to do is to indicate that the set of assumptions and projections for 
aggregate saving does not seem to be reasonable when one looks at past per-
formance and at the components, or as near as one can get to components, 
of past saving. In particular, the effort to be made in the public sector is 
projected to be weak despite the potential for additional taxation out of 
rapidly rising income in sectors like agriculture. The Third Plan notes 
that the potential for additional tax contributions from the agricultural 
sector now exists but there are no specific proposals for realizing more 
revenues7. 
Import and Export Ratios 
In order to have a complete and comparable set of data for the micro-
economic variables of concern here, Table V gives the marginal and average 
ratios of imports and exports to GNP for the last years of each five-year 
period and the average for the three Plan periods. The foreign trade 
relationships are in general more consistent with the interpretations and 
assumptions stated in the Evaluation Report [13] and in the Third Plan [15] 
than those of either saving or taxes. They show the stagnation of exports 
and the slow growth of imports during the first-plan period, the pick-up in 
growth of exports during the Second Plan (and from the first- to the 
second-plan period) as well as the tremendous acceleration in imports during 
the Second Plan that accompanied the foreign-financed "import-liberal-
ization" programme of the past five years. One can also see die further 
acceleration in exports that is expected during the third-plan period. 
The rapid decrease in the marginal rate of imports from 25.5 per cent 
over 1959/60 to 1964/65 to 9.2 per cent from 1964/65 to 1969/70 may be too 
much to expect, since it implies: i) a very sharp deceleration in imports; ii) 
a marginal import ratio only slightly above that during the First Plan; and 
7While total revenue will rise 60 per cent under the Third Plan's high-tax assumption, land taxes 
would rise only 16 per cent if they kept the same share in the increase that they had in total revenue in 
1964/65, despite a projected increase in value added in agriculture of between 25 and 30 per cent. 
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proportion of increased production into the export market". Evidence 
that this was the case would presumably be a marginal export rate that 
was above the average. Such was not the case, however, as the ratio of 
exports to G N P fell regardless of whether one compares 1959/60 with 
1964/65 or the First Plan with the Second Plan. 
III. ASPECT OF PAST A N D PROJECTED FISCAL POLICY 
Tax Proposals 
The growth in government tax revenue over the second-plan period 
has, as noted, been quite satisfactory and represented a substantial break with 
the past. Important steps were taken both: i) in raising the levels of tax rates 
to absorb more private resources; and ii) in the direction most tax rises took. 
Table VI gives the projected and actual 1964/65 revenue by major revenue 
heads, though unfortunately the Second Plan, like the Third Plan, does not 
tell the amount by which taxes would be increased to reach the targets for 
new taxation. Conspicuous in its failure to meet even the target at the old 
rates of tax were taxes on agricultural land. This failure is even more 
important in view of: i) the extended discussion in the Second Plan of the 
need to raise revenue from agriculture; and ii) the greater-than-anticipated 
increases in agricultural incomes over the second-plan period. In addition, 
income and corporation taxes did not rise as rapidly as indirect taxesi on 
imported and domestically produced goods. As a result, the share of d rect 
taxes in total revenue fell over the period. While such a movement, 
particularly over a short period, is not necessarily bad, the time must soon 
come to start raising the share of direct taxes as a concomitant of establishing 
a flexible, income-elastic and relatively more equitable tax system that will 
adjust to a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing economy. In view 
of this need, the projected fall of the share of direct taxes in the Third Plan 
f rom 26 per cent in 1964/65 to less than 24 per cent of total taxes in 1969/70 
is not encouraging. Improvements in the means of imposing relatively 
equitable income-elastic taxes in the agricultural sector command even 
greater urgency than they did in 1960. 
The direction of indirect tax changes over the second-plan period was in 
general an encouraging one. Since many of the changes that were enacted 
were in fact recommended by the Second Plan, the trend is even more 
important. The second-plan period marked the ascendancy of the Planning 
Commission to a high place in the determination of economic policy. 
Indeed I would argue that it was as a framework for policy rather than as a 
blueprint for expenditure that the Plan was most successful, though support 
for that statement is beyond the scope of the present paper. A review of 
second-plan tax proposals and their implementation will illustrate the 
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[13] explains that the achieved 7-per-cent rate of growth of exports greatly 
exceeded the Plan target (3 per cent). Four factors were responsible for the 
more rapid growth: i) greatly increased production of cotton and fine rice; 
ii) diversification of markets; Hi) strengthened incentives; and iv) stronger 
"institutional framework" 1 1 . Strengthened incentives included in the 
Second Plan were the Export Bonus Scheme, essentially a multiple exchange-
rate device to selectively devalue the rupee12, and "fiscal policies, particularly 
additional taxation measures, [which] also helped in curbing consumption 
and directing a larger proportion of increased production into the export 
market" [13, p. 18]. Unfortunately, the latter export policies do not seem 
to have been as successful as the Evaluation Report and the Third Plan would 
have one believe from their texts. Though there may have been some 
effect of the Bonus Scheme on minor exports and remittances from abroad, 
two industries singled out in the Second Plan (cotton textiles and tea 
[14 Pp. 94-95]) for more than one-sentence treatment, both responded negat-
ively over the period13. In these two industries in which the fiscal policy 
package designed to restrict domestic consumption and increase exports 
should have had its quantitatively most important impact, fiscal policy 
did not simply fail to raise the share of exports in increased production, but 
it allowed total exports to fall 14. 
The Third Plan notes that most production increases are projected in 
products that could be consumed at home, and adds "it will be necessary, 
therefore, to adopt fiscal and other measures to restrain consumption of 
exportable commodities and channel increased production into the export 
market" [15]. It will certainly be necessary for the measures adopted to be 
stronger in the Third Plan than in the Second Plan, if the results are to be 
achieved • 
Import Substitution 
Literature on the subject of import substitution has blossomed extens-
ively since the Second Plan was published. The extent of the Second-Plan 
comment on the subject was: "it is necessary to substitute domestic product-
ion for imports wherever possible" [14, p. 96]. Virtually no discussion of 
principles, of policies, or of particular industries followed. N o w , however, 
there exists a sizeable and rapidly growing literature on import substitution in 
Pakistan, including [3; 6; 19; 2 1 ; 22]. The Third Plan itself argues that 
11 See [13, p. 18; 15, Pp. 81-82]. 
12See [1] for an explanation and analysis of the Bonus Scheme. 
13For extended discussions of the consumption-export problem in cotton textiles and tea, see 
[3; 24]. 
14Exports as a per cent of cotton-textile production fell from 19 per cent in 1959/60 to 11 per cent 
in 1963/64, while tea exports as a per cent of production fell from 23 to less than one-tenth of one per cent 
over the same period. Figures are from [6, Pp. 124 and 126]. 
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rates for different types of goods implicitly facing various groups in the 
economy. Although the official rate of exchange is approximately 4.75 
rupees to one US dollar, export taxes, import duties, sales and excise taxes 
and the Export Bonus Scheme introduce easily measurable distortions bet-
ween world and domestic prices at an exchange rate of 4.75, and these dis-
tortions can be thought of as implicit exchange rates. I have not tried 
here to take account of the additional and important problem treated by Pal 
[17] of additional differentials due to the structure of import licensing (i.e., 
quantitative restrictions), though these: i) are quite substantial in many 
industries; and ii) increase the general incentives for import substitution. 
The "export rate" in Table VIII is the amount of rupees (or equivalent 
rupee value) received by an exporter for exports sold for one dollar abroad. 
Export taxes reduce this amount, and the Export Bonus Scheme increases 
it 17. The "import rate facing users" is the total amount in rupees that 
would be paid i) foreign exchange, ii) import duties, and Hi) sales taxes 011 
imports in order to import goods worth one dollar from abroad. The 
"rate facing users" is not an appropriate measure to get the rate of protection, 
however, since there are disincentives to domestic production in the form of 
excise and sales taxes which must be subtracted to get the "import rate fac-
ing producers of substitutes". 
In the absence of indirect taxes and subsidies, all exchange rates would 
be 4.75, but it is quite clear from Table VIII that the differences are quite 
substantial. If one is interested in the problem of encouraging exports relative 
to import substitution, one compares Columns (2) and (4) and if one wishes 
to see the impact of domestic indirect taxes in attempting to divert product-
ion from domestic use to export, one compares Columns (3) and (4). 
The comparisons are revealing. For jute textiles, domestic taxes forced near 
equality between export and domestic-sale incentives, while for cotton textiles 
it would be much more profitable to sell in the domestic market rather than 
to export on the basis of the tax and exchange-rate incentives. 
The implicit exchange rates given in Table VIII are somewhat less 
accurate for the goods classified by type, but the orders of magnitude are 
such that the comparison would not be changed substantially by further 
refinements. It is very difficult to find a rationale for the structure given 
here. The only group of commodities for which the exchange rate and 
indirect tax structure provide incentives for exports greater than those for 
import substitution and domestic use are the investment and related goods 
iyNote that I have assumed here that foreign-offer curves are perfectly elastic. Though this is 
not true for jute and jute goods, it is probably a fairly good approximation for other exports and for 
imports. 
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While the Third Plan may be correct that there are limitations to 
exports imposed by "demand in the international market for Pakistan's 
industrial exports", it is quite clear that the incentive structure has not been 
set up to test the international market to its utmost. It is imperative that 
more adequate steps be taken in the third-plan period to assure that proper 
incentives be given to production for export, greater disincentives to pro-
duction of consumer goods for domestic uses, and greater incentives to 
production of investment and related goods for domestic use, since this 
category receives the most unfavourable exchange rate of any group of 
commodities except raw cotton, raw jute and cotton yarn. 
In view of the exchange rates implicit in Table VIII as well as the 
general characteristics of Pakistan's growth, the size of the current balance-
of-payments deficit and the extent of current overvaluation of the rupee 
[17] even at current levels of taxes and subsidies, one must dispute vigorously 
the statement in the Third Plan that "the ultimate objective (of export policy) 
must be to reduce and gradually eliminate the dependence of our industries 
on the Export Bonus Scheme, by strengthening our export incentives 
through other fiscal measures and increasing the efficiency of our industrial 
units" [15, p. 90]. It seems abundantly clear from all indications that the 
Pakistan rupee is still overvalued at the rate of 4.75 to the US dollar, even with 
the current props to maintain the official rate. It would be more rational 
to move in the direction of providing adequate incentives to the export 
industries by a more realistic exchange rate. Since the value of a dollar's 
worth of imports to the economy is in the neighbourhood of 7.5 to 9 
rupees, it is quite clear that valuing exports at 6.2 or 6.8 rupees represents a 
clear loss of welfare, since increased exports can buy increased imports which 
have a higher value to the economy than import substitutes19. The political 
disagreeableness of talking about devaluation is quite obvious, and it is per-
fectly understandable that a government would prefer to solve its exchange-
rate problems by implicit rather than explicit devaluation. If, however, 
the aim of fiscal and balance-of-payments policy in the Third Plan is to try to 
"legitimize" an export exchange rate of 4.75, instead of at the bonus rate, 
the Plan is not very well conceived. Import substitution through higher 
protection will lead to lower real income than export promotion through 
more realistic exchange rates. 
IV. SUMMARY A N D CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the reasons for improved growth performance of 
Pakistan's economy in recent years has not been attempted here. Some of 
1 9 0 n the value of import substitutes, see [22]. Note again that the value of a dollar's worth 
of imports is based solely on the exchange rate and indirect tax system. The substantial additional 
premium on imports reported in [ 17] is not included. If it were included, however, the differential 
incentive for import substitution is even more pronounced. 
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to the large increase in resources made available in the form of greatly-
increased imports. Substantial rises in indirect-tax rates took place in the 
directions the Second Plan has indicated. The increases that took place, 
however, were not adequate to restrict domestic consumption of important 
exportable commodities. There was some movement towards a more 
rational set of incentives for promotion of exports and for the improvement 
of incentives for import substitution in intermediate and capital goods. A 
major area of public policy yet to be resolved, however, is the establishment 
of a set of exchange rates and domestic indirect taxes that will sufficiently 
encourage production for export relative to production for the domestic 
market. The projected decline in the marginal and average import ratios 
and the massive size of the implied import substitution programme seem to 
be unwarranted until adequate incentives for export industries are established 
through exchange rate or indirect tax rate adjustments. 
Progress during the second-plan period was good, though it is 
impossible to say how good with much accuracy. Progress in the third-
plan period will continue to be made only if there are increased attempts to 
rationalize the exchange- and tax-rate systems and to tap additional domestic 
resources for public saving without reducing private saving. These are 
tough realities, tougher because of the deceleration of growth of imports 
and import surpluses projected for the Third Plan. The economy, and 
particular sectors of the economy, will not enjoy in the third-plan period 
the initial lift they received from rapidly rising imports during the second-
plan period. Adequate government policy measures will have to be taken, 
and since they will be taken without the rapidly rising additions to resources 
f rom abroad, there are bound to be more decisions in the Third Plan that 
will hit particular sectors harder than the same measures would have during 
the second-plan period when imports were being "liberalized" more and 
more each year. 
When the stated objectives of increasing social and economic justice 
are added o these above difficulties, it is clear that Pakistan must devote 
herself to the development effort with even more vigour than she has in the 
past if the aims and objectives of the Third Plan are to be fulfilled. 
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since the new bases have not been used to fill in the earlier years, a part of 
differences between the fifties and sixties is due to different bodies of statistics. 
Different evaluations of the performance during the 1960's are due in part to 
the three new sets of G N P and investment estimates that have appeared in 
the past three years. While I would definitely not join some cynics who have 
said that the successful completion of the Second Plan was due to a successful 
revision of the national accounts, a great deal of caution needs to be ex-
ercised in drawing specific conclusions (or calculating fixed coefficients) 
f rom this period when the estimates were changing so rapidly, and when 
they are likely to change still more. 
To save others the time of comparing the effects of the revised esti-
mates on some of the key macroeconomic magnitudes, I have prepared 
tables of comparison for the years 1959/60 to 1964/65 which are given below. 
Table A-I compares the three successive estimates of investment, imports, 
exports, GNP, and saving that appeared in the 1963, 1964 and 1965 reports 
of the Planning Commission. Since the largest basic changes are in the 
investment series, Table A-II compared the components of gross investment 
f rom the three reports, and one can see that a principal source of the rise in 
the estimates for total investment was the increase in the "monetized" 
investment of the private sector. The various national product estimates 
that were available for the year 1959/60 are given in Table A-III, by sectors 
of origin of national product, so that one can compare the source of change 
in the aggregate estimates. 
The most interesting differences are to be found between the Plan-
ning-Commission estimates in the 1904 Mid-Plan Review and the new official 
estimates of the National Income Commission for 1959/60 as a base year, 
shown in Table A-III. The Planning-Commission estimates were signi-
ficantly higher in mining (by 28 per cent), large-scale manufacturing (by 28 
per cent), small-scale manufacturing (by 28 per cent), construction (by 77 
per cent), public utilities (by 40 per cent), and ownership of dwellings (by 
95 per cent). It is also quite a bit higher in other services, but since the 
National Income Commission estimates are higher for wholesale and retail 
trade, for banking and insurance and for transport and communications, 
there may be an offset due to different classification among these three 
categories, while there is less likelihood of overlap among other sectors. 
The National Income Commission estimates are higher for the largest sector, 
agriculture, fisheries and forestry (by 10 per cent) and for the general services 
category (by 16 per cent). Using as a naive rule of thumb the notion that 
the official statistics generally understate the value of almost anything that 
they attempt to measure (i.e., that undercoverage is much more important 
than double counting), I have shown in the last column of Table A-III a 
naive recomputation of G N P for 1959/60 based on the higher of the two 
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Price Data and Investment Deflators 
There are other problems of using aggregate statistics on an historical 
basis, particularly when one wants to convert data to constant prices. For 
some commodities (particularly those that are somewhat homogenous, 
those that were relatively very important in terms of value produced or sold 
in the 1950's and those whose prices are not controlled) there are relatively 
good data with good coverage over time that appear to be fairly sensitive 
to changes in supply and demand conditions. Major foodgrains, cotton, 
jute and sugarcane, and many minor foodgrains, are well covered among 
agricultural commodities. Fruits and vegetables, and forestry, fishery, and 
livestock products (except hides and skins) are not well covered in either 
extent or accuracy. Cotton textiles, jute textiles, cigarettes, tea and a few 
other consumer goods are fairly well covered among manufactured goods, 
but prices of many manufactured goods are not well covcred, regardless of 
whether the goods are of domestic or of foreign origin. Perhaps the worst 
coverage of all is in producers goods and manufactured raw materials, 
particularly those that are imported, which latter constitute the major share 
of such products. Since the weight of producer goods, and particularly 
imported producers goods, has increased over the past ten years in total 
domestic availability of manufactures (see [6]) the most poorly registered 
goods are becoming more important in what should be the price index for 
manufacturers. Finally, if one wishes to construct a price index for invest-
ment goods that can be used to deflate or inflate historical series of invest-
ment (depending on whether they are estimated first in current or 
constant prices) one is almost completely at a loss for reasons both of 
conceptual definition and coverage of price statistics. 
Why pick out an investment deflator or inflator as the least reliable? 
First of all, some prices were controlled during the period so the recorded 
price movements do not reflect movements in relative scarcities, which is 
presumably why we are interested in prices. Blackmarkets existed and 
still do exist for cement and for imported goods of all types, machinery and 
equipment included. The domestic prices of imports, as shown by 
[17], arc well above cScf prices plus duties, due to currency overvaluation 
and artificial restrictions on imports. What we do not know is how this 
mark-up behaved over time, although there is a general feeling that it has 
fallen over the past decade as foreign-exchange availability (and the volume 
of imports) increased and as the domestic supply of close or distant sub-
stitutes rose (see again [6]). In addition to the fact that the controlled prices, 
which are most likely to be recorded, do not reflect scarcities or movements 
in scarcities, there is extremely poor coverage of producer goods in official 
statistics. Despite the fact that domestic production of machinery (except 
electrical) in 1959/60 was less than 13 per cent of total availability, the 
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Since Papanek's estimates f o r industrial investment in the 1950's 
are probably the best currently available, I need hardly say more about the 
reliance we can put on investment estimates, current or constant price, for 
that period. I have already mentioned investment estimates since 1959/60. 
Since saving estimates depend on estimates of investment, the level and the 
movement of the saving estimates are certainly questionable and conclu-
sions should be drawn with exceedingly great caution. 
For all the above reasons, while there is no doubt that G N P is now 
growing faster than it was, that investment ratios are higher than they were 
a n d that saving ratios are higher than they were, to put faith in specific values 
of these magnitudes seems to me quite unjustified. Since future government 
efforts and government policy would need to be more strict and more 
decisive the more pessimistic theoutlook for marginal saving, export and 
import ratios, it seems to me that it is dangerous to pick the rosy outlook for 
the third-plan period and to say all that needs to be done is to continue 
what we have been doing. Maintaining the performance of the past five 
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The Structure of Revenue from 
Indirect Taxes in Pakistan 
Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. & Sarfraz Khan Qureshi 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that Central Government indirect taxes make up 
approximately three-fourths of the combined revenue of the Central and 
Provincial Governments in Pakistan, virtually no detailed studies of these 
taxes and their rate structure, revenue structure, effect on prices and effect 
on resource allocation have been undertaken as yet. This paper summarizes 
and presents some of the findings of preliminary studies on taxation un-
dertaken at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. A compa-
nion piece on the rate structure of these taxes appears in the Autumn-1964 
issue of The Pakistan Development Review. Further analysis is necessary, 
however, both in combining the results of these two studies and in bringing 
to bear other evidence such as price behaviour, underlying commodity 
flows and the impact of the various licensing systems in operation in 
Pakistan, before any firm conclusions about the impact of indirect taxes, 
their elasticity and their incidence, can be formed. 
The importance of indirect taxes as tools of differential government 
policy need not be laboured here. The fact that they can be used to en-
courage or discourage particular types of resource utilization, as well as 
withdrawing purchasing power from the private sector in general, make 
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Customs and Central Excise Administration Reports4. For years other than 
1953/54 to 1956/57 and for the sales tax collections both on imports and on 
domestic goods, the only source of detailed data is the unpublished records 
of the C B R . The C B R has made these records available to the Institute 
for its work on the tax system. 
A word should be said regarding the classification of taxes as given 
in the Budget and in most official documents5. First, as noted above, there 
is no commodity breakdown of indirect taxes other than for excise duties. 
This limits the detailed analytical usefulness of the budget data. Second, 
there is a tendency to report customs duties, both import duties and export 
duties, together and to discuss trends in total collection from both. The 
same is true of sales taxes which fall on imports, exports, and domestic 
production. Thus, it is not possible to use the budget data even for gross 
analytical computations, such as the taxes on all export flows, all import 
flows, and all flows of domestic production. This rather serious drawback 
could be remedied quite easily since the basic data on collections specify 
the account from which the revenue comes. Such a reform in reporting 
would increase the usefulness of the budget and its supporting documents 
considerably at practically no cost. The addition of a commodity break-
down for all taxes would be extremely useful also, but it would require a 
more basic decision on the amount of detail desired in the budget documents. 
At the very least, the way should be cleared to make the detailed classificat-
ion available with short time-lags in the form of publications by the C B R . 
In this paper, we have given all our classification according to major types 
of flow (import, export, and production), as well as commodity group 
taxed. This should, we hope, be of more use to the analysts of the Pakistan 
economy. 
Since data from the budget documents are not in sufficient detail 
for the present study and unpublished data have been used, a comparison 
of the unpublished data from the C B R and the data from the budgets is 
necessary. Table I presents three sets of figures for the period 1954-63. 
Obviously, there is little consistent relationship among the three 
different sets of figures thai we have compared here. In some years one is 
higher, in some another. Close agreement between any two of the three 
sources is n o t consistent from year to year. There are, however, very few 
4See [3]. The Indian Central Board of Revenue first brought out such report in 1938/39. Its 
publication was suspended, however, with the outbreak of World War II. After Independence, three 
such reports have been published for the fiscal years 1954/55, 1955/56 and 1956/57. Besides dealing with 
the administrative work of the Customs and Excise Departments, each report has fairly comprehensive 
statistical appendices. 
5See, for example, [4; 5; 6], 
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the consumption-goods and for the capital-goods industries. The govern-
ment and miscellaneous accounts are treated together (and separately f rom 
other groups) not because of any analytical usefulness but simply because 
of our inability to distribute these into the other categories. Our classificat-
ion is similar to the one used by Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East (ECAFE) as modified by the Planning Commission of the Gov-
ernment of Pakistan. It differs primarily because the basic industrial 
breakdown available in the revenue data is not as fine as would be necessary 
to follow exactly the same pattern7. 
III. INCIDENCE OF INDIRECT T A X E S : A QUESTION OF I N T E R P R E T A T I O N 
Before discussing the evidence, a note of caution is in order. 
Although these data have been classified by industry of origin and type of 
good, it is not possible to move directly to the conclusion that either the user 
or the producer has been taxed to the extent of the revenue raised, or the 
same division would be correct for all goods. The incidence, or final 
resting place, or identification of " w h o really suffer reduced real income" 
from the imposition of indirect taxes has certainly not been settled in either 
the theoretical or the empirical literature on indirect taxes. A convenient 
way to think of the revenue from indirect taxes is set out here. 
Indirect taxes are taxes on certain events (or flows), such as the pro— 
duction, sale, import, or export of commodities. What we have done in 
the classification system is to organize the collections of revenue by different 
kinds of events. Thus, revenue from import taxes on iron and steel re-
presents the receipts from a charge on the import flow of a particular kind of 
good. The question of who suffers a loss of real income because of the 
tax is irrelevent in the first instance. Likewise, the structure of indirect 
tax revenue by commodity groups changes over the period covered. No 
immediate inference can be drawn from the changes in the revenue struct-
ure about the changes in the flows of real income from different parts of the 
private sector that must accompany those changes in revenue structure. 
A simple illustration of the above point is necessary, even though 
it is in terms of partial-equilibrium arialy sis. Suppose that many flows 
of goods are regulated by direct government control or licensing, a situation 
largely true in Pakistan. Imports, even after the recent liberalizations but 
certainly in the period covered by our study, are strictly rationed almost 
without regard to market pressure within Pakistan. For any given type of 
7The classification of commodity groups in the Appendix tables into type of goods is as follows: 
consumption goods: 1 - 18 , 24; raw materials for consumption goods: 20-23, 24; raw materials for capital 
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The Rate Structure of Indirect 
Taxes in Pakistan 
Ghulam Mohammad Radhu 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the rate structure of indirect 
taxes in Pakistan with particular emphasis on the incentive aspects of the tax 
structure. The rate structure of indirect taxes, however, is only one of the 
many factors that influence the relative prices and relative profitabilities of 
industries. Direct controls, like the import-licensing system, exchange-rate 
policy, the export-bonus scheme, etc., may in fact have greater impact on 
relative prices and on the pattern of investment than indirect tax rates. 
However, this paper examines the differential incentives provided by the 
rate structure of indirect taxes alone, assuming that the market is allowed to 
operate freely and that rate structure is the major factor influencing relative 
prices of industrial goods. 
The traditional objectives of taxation policy have been confined 
largely to diverting sufficient resources to the government sector to match 
its expenditures. However, recent developments in fiscal thought have 
come to assign a more positive role to taxation policy in economic develop-
ment, and the impact of the tax structure on the rate and direction of a 
saving and investment is widely recognized. In Pakistan and other under-
developed countries, in view of the inadequate coverage and administrative 
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on the basis of statutory rates or the rates chargeable as a result of general 
exemption for all countries, whichever applied. Other concessional rates 
chargeable under G A T T or preferential rates for the United Kingdom and 
other Commonwealth countries have not been taken into consideration. 
The averages are simple arithmetic means. They have been calculated by 
adding all the rates of duties in each industry or category divided by the 
total number of items in that category of the tariff schedule. In some cases 
where the mode has been found more representative than the mean, the mode 
has been taken as the "average". We have converted the specific excise 
duties into ad valorem in order to calculate the averages. The method adopt-
ed is as follows: from the Year Books of the Central Statistical Office, we 
have taken the annual average wholesale prices for the exciseable goods and 
the rates of excises have been deducted from the wholesale prices in order 
to get a rough estimate of the cost prices. Then, we calculated the rates of 
excises as a percentage of the cost prices. 
Export Taxes 
Table I presents the rates of export duty for the years 1948-63. It is 
obvious from the table that export duties have gradually been abolished. 
By 1963, only five goods were subject to the export tax. In order to give 
further incentives for exports, most sales taxes on export goods were sus-
pended in 1961. Thus, there is no sales tax on any export goods (dome-
stically produced) other than ginned cotton [1, p. 19]. 
The present export duties on raw cotton and raw jute act as disincent-
ives to the producers of these commodities. The tax reduces the earnings 
of the exporters and growers and, thus, has an adverse effect on the volume 
of exports. The imposition of an export duty on cotton and jute reduces 
the relative profitability of these commodities, and the production of com-
peting crops like rice and sugarcane becomes more profitable [3]. Thus, 
diversion of resources takes place from the production of exportable goods 
towards food crops for domestic consumption. Moreover, to the extent 
that the export duty keeps domestic prices of raw jute and raw cotton lower 
than world prices, it is a kind of subsidy to domestic textile industries. As 
raw cotton and jute are then available at lower prices and in larger quantities 
to the textile industries, the domestic prices of cotton textile and jute manu-
factures will be lower. This encourages domestic consumption of cotton 
and jute textiles, which results in a higher domestic absorption of raw cotton 
and raw jute. 
Import Taxes 
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Suppose OM is the maximum output, beyond which the producer 
is incapable of extending production due to artificial or licensed supply 
restrictions on inputs. The marginal cost curve C S W , therefore, becomes 
vertical at this point and intersects the marginal revenue curve at point T. 
Hence price before taxation is equal to OP. Suppose an ad valorem tax is 
imposed resulting in an upward shifting of the lower segment of marginal 
cost curve from CS to C 'S ' . After the maximum output is reached, the new 
marginal cost curve C ' S ' W becomes vertical in the same way as C S W , 
and intersects the marginal revenue curve at the same point as before the 
tax. Price and output remain the same but profit is reduced. However, 
if the tax is high enough to raise the marginal cost curve from CS to C " S " 
(i.e., to raise marginal cost above marginal revenue at price P), then both 
price and output are affected. In Figure 1, price would rise to P' and out-
put (sales) would fall to M' . 
The underlying assumption of our hypothesis is that imported capital 
goods and raw materials have few alternative uses and that the cost structure 
of various firms within an industry are not significantly dissimilar. Under 
these conditions, the imposition of a tax on one industry does not lead to a 
diversion of resources from the taxed industry to other untaxed fields. 
Even if we drop these assumptions the above figure would be likely to hold 
true for a group of industries, though it may not hold true for a single 
industry. Such would be the case because the maximum amount of import-
ed inputs available for the industries as a group is fixed which tends to make 
the supply of domestically produced goods inelastic. 
The problem is to find a suitable way of testing this hypothesis. We 
have attempted to do this by examining tax changes and price changes in 
the past few years, assuming that if an increase in tax has been followed by an 
increase in price and a decrease in tax has been followed by a decrease in 
price, then the tax has been shifted forward, but if an increase in the t a x has 
been responded to by a decrease in price or by no change in price, then the 
tax has not been shifted forward. Prices may rise or fall due to other factors, 
however. There may be shifts in domestic demand or there may be changes 
in the flow of imports or exports which have substantial impact on relative 
prices. If imports of certain raw materials or capital goods are tightened, 
then the supply of some domestic commodities using those imports may be 
reduced, resulting in a rise in price. Or, if licences are issued liberally to 
import certain consumer goods, then the price of the import as well as the 
prices of the competing indigenous goods are likely to fall. Similarly, the 
Export Bonus Scheme and other export-promotion measures affect internal 
prices. Prices of agricultural commodities fluctuate widely. A crop 
failure of, say, jute or cotton would have serious implications, for not only 
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Income Velocity and Pakistan's 
Second Plan 
Richard C. Porter 
All attempt is made in this paper to appraise the extent to which die 
income velocity concept1 is a useful tool in the financial planning of the 
Second Five-Year Plan. For many years now, economists have been skeptical 
of the efficacy of velocity analysis, but most of this skepticism derives from 
its disastrous failure in the depression of the 1930's. Theorists generally 
concede its applicability in full-capacity situations2, and it is in just such a 
situation that it is being applied in current analyses of the financial impli-
cation of Pakistan's Second Plan. 
Nevertheless, the basic reason why the quantity theory is being revived 
in Pakistan, and in many other developing countries, is not so much its 
theoretical relevance as its great practicability. "Modern" Keynesian gap 
analysis is just not feasible where data on consumption and investment 
(not to mention their functional determinants) are totally lacking. Since 
data do exist for velocity analysis3, it is used for want of a better. 
ITfae concepts, income velocity, quantity theory, liquidity preference and real-money balance 
schedule are merely different ways of viewing a hypothesized relation between money and income. In 
this paper, the latter is preferred but the terms are used interchangeably. 
2For a comprehensive discussion and extensive bibliography 011 the quantity theory of money, see 
[2 ; 8, especially Chapters 8 and 10]. 
3Though, as will be seen, such data may not be sufficiently accurate, plentiful, or rich (i.e., varied) 
to yield meaningful income-velocity estimates. 
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The conclusion of this paper, summarised in a sentence, is that resort 
to velocity analysis to avoid inflation is unnecessary, uncertain and mis-
leading. The statistical estimates seem to "explain" movements in real-money 
balances quite well and conform to a priori predilections very satisfactorily, 
but grave uncertainties are incurred when these historical fits are used to 
predict the future. 
Velocity analysis may be misleading if it suggests that the supply of 
money is a variable completely independent of its demand. In Pakistan 
today, it is very probably that the supply of money adjusts, at least partially, 
to its demand; this may mean that price levels are not determined by the 
demand for money but the reverse, that the money supply adjusts to the 
demand forthcoming at a particular price level. It is not only useless but 
dangerous to use a theory based upon the assumption of an exogenous 
money supply and an endogenous price level when the reverse may be true. 
And finally, it is suggested that the " n e w " approach of the Planning Com-
mission may successfully avoid the need to use velocity (or Keynesian) 
concepts to ensure stable price levels during the Second Plan. 
That application of quantity theory in Pakistan is uncertain should not 
be surprising to anyone; and to attack believers in a unique and meaningful 
income velocity is, admittedly, to annihilate straw men. Nevertheless, a 
rigorous analysis of the reasons for holding money balances in low-income 
economies and of the statistical evidence of the 1950's is an extremely useful 
prelude to the other problems of income velocity. The majority of the paper 
(Sections I-IV) is devoted to an examination of the theory, data and statistical 
estimates concerning income velocity in Pakistan. Although the final two 
sections argue that this work is not only unhelpful but even dangerous 
from the viewpoint of planning price stability during the plan period, the 
historical analysis does yield some interesting insights into the Pakistan 
I. INCOME V E L O C I T Y IN AN U N D E R D E V E L O P E D E C O N O M Y 
The first problem that arises in the use of the income velocity o fmoney 
concept is that of definition of "money" and of "income". In industrialized 
countries, economists devote far more attention to the appropriate definition 
of money while, curiously, in underdeveloped economies, it is the definition 
of income that gives the greater difficulty. 
To define money, one must decide jute how liquid an asset should be 
if it is to be included with currency as part of the money supply. It is generally 
conceded, even in nations where the banking habit is relatively under-
developed, that current-account (or demand) deposits may be considered 
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perfectly liquid4. The question arises the world over whether time (or 
saving) deposits should also be included. The answer in Pakistan is, I think, 
a very definite no. There are too many assets that are generally held in large 
(and often unknown) quantities that are at least as liquid as time deposits 
for example, gold, government saving certificates, prize bonds, cooperative 
shares, and (at least somewhat) durable commodities. Time deposits are not 
considered, by most people, as the next most liquid asset after currency and 
demand deposits5; if they are included in the "money" supply, then the 
other assets listed above should not be neglected. But such an expansion of 
the concept of money leads not only to theoretical difficulties but, more 
critically, to something quite impossible to measure. It would be foolhardy 
to neglect the most accurate economic data published in Pakistan; money 
supply is, therefore, taken as currency in circulation (outside banks) and 
demand deposits (of other than governments). 
In most studies of income velocity, some time is spent deciding bet-
ween the various measures of income, G N P , N N P , National Income, and 
Disposable Income. The usual conclusion is that any of the first three are 
equally desirable. In countries where around, or less than, 10 per cent of the 
national income is traded in kind or self-consumed, the problems of income 
definition are easily solved. In Pakistan where perhaps 50 per cent is gene-
rated and disposed off without the use of money, one must consider care-
fully the reasons for a relationship between money and income before de-
ciding 011 the appropriate definition of the latter. 
Keynes suggested three reasons why individuals, and businesses, wish 
to hold money balances, the now famous trinity of transactions, speculative 
and precautionary demands. The first is clearly related to the number and 
amount of money transactions that people make; and these transactions, in 
turn, may be considered closely related to that part of income which is not 
bartered or self-consumed. The second Keynesian motive, speculative, is 
concerned with the alternative interest-earning and capital-gain-making 
opportunities foregone by holding money. The demand for precautionary 
balances is the most nebulous (though not so controversial as the speculative 
balances) of the three in the General Theory; Keynes says nothing of their 
determinants except that precautionary balances are probably not affected 
by interest rates [3, p. 17 1 ] . 
What Keynes calls the precautionary motive is probably very import-
ant in Pakistan. Many people live sufficiently near the margin of subsistence 
that they must make careful provision for emergency money needs. And the 
4The relationship of demand deposits to currency has, in any case, been so stable over the period 
to be considered that it matters little whether one, the other, or both are made the basis of analysis. 
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i) If permanent shortages (on legal markets, and higher prices on 
blackmarkets) are expected, there is reasons for believing that real-money 
balances will rise. Such balances are an economic good and, in these 
circumstances, their cost to the consumer, in terms of foregone consumption 
opportunities is reduced. Another reason is that many individuals either 
will adjust slowly their consumption habits to the blackmarket price or will 
prefer to wait for a chance to buy the article legally at the artificially low 
controlled price. Such queues may be of long duration, during which time 
higher cash balances will be held30. 
ii) If the shortages are expected to be temporary, there is even greater 
reason to postpone purchases; and postponed consumption is present saving. 
Not only will savings rise more when the shortages are expected soon to 
pass, but a much greater proportion will be held in money balances, to be 
ready for imminent spending. 
Controls on business imports for investment purposes have induced 
similar reactions. The growing time-lag between the investment decision 
and the actual import has probably meant much large business-money bal-
ances. And all these larger balances, of businesses and of individuals, are 
desired balances in the context of the control situation, however preferable 
other situations might be. 
In the past year, more liberal import licensing and export bonus 
vouchers have reduced shortages of luxury goods, and it may well be that 
desired money balances will decline concomitantly. There is no way of 
knowing what part of the "desired money balances" we have estimated have 
been desired only in the context of the controls in force. That they have 
not been negligible is indicated by the data for 1960/61. The money supply 
rose by only about 4 per cent between 1959 and 1960 (December figures); 
the price level, by almost any estimate, will surely, in 1960/61, rise by at 
least that31. It is not improbable that real-money balances will have 
declined by 10 per cent during 1960/61 (from 4692 million rupees in Decem-
ber 1959)32. 
The theory of price controls and quantity restraints is in a very pre-
liminary state, and these comments on their possible effects upon money 
balances are speculative (to say the best). Nevertheless, the warning is 
30Of course, physical queues outside a fair price shop seldom entail the holding of cash balances 
more than an hour or two. But there is the government licensing queue also, and the collection of the 
proper forms, licences and permissions may take months, even years. 
3 1 C S O figures on cost of living indicate that prices had already risen by 4 per cent between June 
and August of 1960 in some parts of Pakistan. 
32Some part of the decline in real-money balances will be induced by the very rise in prices (see 
Section IV); but the probable extent of the decline strongly suggests a shift in the schedule as well. 
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VI. MONEY DURING T H E SECOND P L A N 
In order to put the preceding conclusion into the context of the next 
five years, it is interesting to consider two extreme positions. First, let us 
naively accept the estimates of Section III, and second, concern ourselves 
only with the fears expressed in Section V. 
Equation (14') suggests that the public's desire for real-money balances 
will rise by about one-half (.49) of any increase in real income35. This 
estimate was seen, in Section III, to be consistent with our a priori predilec-
tions — it might imply, for example, that the marginal propensity to hold 
wealth in money form for precautionary purposes (a2) be .05 and that the 
transactions income velocity of money (i/aj) be 5.0. And such values 
certainly do not violate our historical sensitivity. 
But the implications of Equation (14') for the Second Fivc-Year Plan 
arc astonishing. If real national income per annum rises, as anticipated by 
the Plan, by about 4400 million rupees36, then desired real-money balances 
should increase by some 2200 million rupees. Translating this into nominal 
terms on the assumption of stable prices (at the 1959/60 level37), this means 
that the money supply may expand by about 2,700 million rupees38 with-
out inducing the public to lower its real balances by driving up prices. This 
is cin absurdly high estimate —— 
few, if any, economists familiar with the 
Pakistan economy in 1961 would suggest that such a money expansion is 
consistent with price stability. 
The warnings of Section V are not to be neglected. In fact, careful 
heed of these warnings may lead to quite pessimistic views on the feasible 
expansion of the money supply. If one considers only the facts of price 
decontrol, import liberalization, present rapid rise in prices (in the near 
absence of deficit finance and the currently small rate of increase of the money 
supply39, and the great shock provided by the population census (which 
indicated that real per capita income has perhaps failed to grow during the 
1950's), then it is not difficult to understand, if not to agree with, those dis-
illusioned economists who cry out for a cessation of deficits and monetary 
expansion. 
35This means also, of course, that the public's desire for nominal money balances will increase by 
about one-half of any rise in current-price national income (prices unchanged). 
36 Approximately one-fifth of the 1959/60 real-national income. 
37This assumption has already been proven wrong, but this does not affect the present argument. 
38Approximately 1.23 times the real-money expansion (1.23 being the price level in 1959/60). 
39Income velocity rose by about 10 per cent in 1959/60 (see Appendix) and is probably rising 
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Effectiveness of Bank Rate 
Instrument in Pakistan 
M. Umer Chapra 
On January 15, 1959, bank rate was raised in Pakistan from its trad-
itional level of 3 per cent to 4 per cent. This paper examines the effect of 
this rise of one percentage point in the bank rate 011 the borrowings of sche-
duled banks from the State Bank, their reserves, their lending rates, the 
supply of their credit and the allocation of their credit among various sectors 
of the economy. This is done by comparing the values of certain relevant 
variables primarily in the year before the bank-rate change (1958) and the 
year after the bank-rate change (1959). From this examination of a single 
experience in Pakistan, it is not desired to prove that the bank rate would be 
effective or ineffective in future. It would, however, be unwise to ignore 
this bit of historical evidence in the country. The assessment will certainly 
give some idea of what to expect in future in comparable circumstances. 
A rise in bank rate may be effective in curtailing scheduled-bank 
credit in two different ways. First, it may be an effective way of announc-
ing to both the banks and the public the direction of the State-Bank policy. 
Scheduled banks may become cautious as a result of this and may, therefore, 
refuse to lend as much as previously at a given rate o£ interest. Second, a 
higher bank rate would make it costlier for scheduled banks to borrow from 
the State Bank. Scheduled banks may maintain relatively higher reserves 
after an increase in the bank rate because they know that in the event they 
have to borrow from the State Bank, it will be at a higher rate. However, 
bank rate would become a penalty rate only if the scheduled banks do not 
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TABLE I 
F A C T O R S C H A N G I N G 5 C H B D U L E D - B A M K R E S E R V E S I N 
P A K I S T A N I N T H E Y E A R 1959 
(in million rupees) 
4- — 
Increase in currency outside the State Bank" 48.9 
Increase in government and other deposits at the 
State Bank (excluding deposits of scheduled 
banks) 128.7 
Increase in gold, foreign assets and balances held 
outside Pakistan6 2484 
Decrease in government obligations'' 8.6 
Increase in State-Bank investments in government 
and foreign securities 18.2 
Decrease in other assets (net of other liabilities)1' 26.1 
Total: 266.6 212.3 
Gross increase in reserves (266.6 — 212.3) 54-3 
Less borrowings f rom the State Bank —42.6 
Net increase in scheduled-bank reserves 1 1 . 7 
Note: The table is constructed from i) the balance sheets of both the Issue a n d the Banking D e p a r t m e n t s 
of the State Bank of Pakistan, ii) the consolidated position of scheduled banks, and iii) treasury currency. 
Based on data published in State Bank Bulletins. Data represent increases or decreases in a n n u a l averages 
of figures on last Friday of e ach month i n 1959 over those in 1958. 
"Includes State-Bank notes outstanding and treasury c u r r e n c y ou t s ide the Sta te Bank. 
^Inc ludes assets held with the Reserve Bank of Ind ia . 
^includes d o m e s t i c assets held in the Issue Department, g o v e r n m e n t treasury bills, p r o v i n c i a l 
government debtor balances, loans and advances to governments, and treasury currency. 
^Includes loans a n d advances o t h e r t h a n those to the scheduled banks, o t h e r assets, less bills pay-
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This decline in private demand for credit also explains why the sche-
duled banks had positive free reserves6 in 1959 against their tradition of 
nagative free reserves (Table IV). In 1959, scheduled banks had positive 
free reserves to the extent of .07 per cent of their demand-and-time liabilities 
subject to reserve requirements against average negative free reserves of 1.3 
per cent from 1954 through 1958. In 1959, it was not profitable for banks 
to borrow from the State Bank and invest in government securities because 
the weighted average yield on government securities was lower than the 
bank rate. As stated earlier, the weighted average yield was 3.2 per cent on 
central government securities and 3.6 per cent on provincial government 
securities. The yield on private loans was certainly greater than the bank 
rate, as mentioned earlier, and the banks could have profited by lending more 
to the private sector on the basis of their positive free reserves and also by 
borrowing more from the State Bank. But the demand for credit by the 
private sector had declined, as shown above. Another evidence for the 
decline in private demand for credit is that the rates ofscheduled-bank lending 
to the private sector did not rise fast enough in response to the increase in 
the bank rate. The weighted average rate of scheduled-bank lending to the 
private sector, as stated earlier, was 4.21 per cent on December 30, 1958, 
T A B L E IV 
FREE RESERVES OF SCHEDULED BANKS IN PAKISTAN, 1954-60 










a s % o f 
Col. (S) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1954 42.1 51.0 — 8.9 1,704.0 - 0 . 5 
1955 54-9 76.7 —21.8 1,894.6 —1.2 
1956 75-2 94.9 —19.7 2,098.3 —0.9 
1957 45-6 HI.5 —65.9 2,289.9 —3.0 
1958 72.5 100.1 —27.6 2,584.9 —x.l 
1959 78.0 57-S + 20.5 2,803.1 + 0 . 7 
1960 36.7 122.4 - 8 5 . 7 3,214-9 —-2.6 
Note: Columns (2), (3), (4) and (5) are in million Source: Based on data from State Bank Bulletins. 
rupees and are annual averages of figures 
on last Friday of every month. 
Earlier years have been omitted because data for Column (3) are not available. 
6Free reserves=excess reserves scheduled banks minus their borrowings from the State Bank. 
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but rose only to 4.96 per cent on June 30,1959 and to 5.14 per cent on Decem-
ber 31 , 1959. The scheduled banks were, therefore, constrained to have 
positive free reserves. 
The year 1960 presents an entirely different picture from that in 1959. 
Inspite of the higher bank rate in 1960, the banks had negative free reserves. 
Their negative free reserves in 1960 were 2.6 per cent of their demand-and-
time liabilities subject to reserve requirements (Table IV). In other words, 
their free reserves in 1960 were lower than in any previous year. Bank 
credit to the private sector increased at the rate of 27 per cent in 1960 and 
scheduled-bank holdings of government securities declined by 6 per cent. 
Total bank credit increased at the rate of 12 per cent, i.e., 1 percentage point 
higher than in any previous year. If the bank rate were effective, it should 
have suppressed the rate of expansion of bank credit to the private sector 
even in 1960. But when private demand for credit recovered, the scheduled 
banks lent to the private sector much more and reduced their investments in 
government securities. In 1959, there was a shift to government securities 
in the portfolios of scheduled banks but in 1960 there was a shift back to 
the private sector. 
The question that may now be asked is that if the higher bank rate did 
not reduce the rate of expansion of bank credit, did it change its allocation 
among different sectors of the economy. 
Table V gives the percentage distribution of scheduled-bank advances 
between various sectors of the economy. In 1958, there was a significant 
change in the allocation of bank credit to many sectors. But in 1959 (the 
year after the bank-rate change), there seems to be no significant change over 
1958 except for the trend evident after 1955. 
The share of commerce declined by about 4 percentage points in 
1959. But there has been a declining trend in the share of commerce after 
1955. Its share declined by an even greater magnitude in 1958 (by 12 per 
cent). The share of "services" seems to have increased significantly in 1959 
(about 54 per cent of its 1958 level). But it increased significantly even in 
1958 (by about 53 per cent of its level in 1957). Thus, if there is a change in 
the share of any sector after the bank-rate change, it seems less likely to be 
due to the increase in the bank rate and more likely to be due to factors 
already in operation before 1959. 
We find that the borrowings of scheduled banks from the State Bank 
did decline but less than the increase in their reserves after the bank-rate 
change. The rate of interest charged by the scheduled banks on their loans 
to the public increased but gradually and slightly less than the increase in 
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government will have to raise the rate of interest on new issues of govern-
ment securities to make these attractive to the scheduled banks8. If this 
is not done, private credit will be more attractive for banks because of a higher 
yield and also because of possibilities of capital loss on government securities 
in the event their price is allowed to fall. If the rate of interest is raised on 
government securities the interest burden of new public debt will rise and, 
therefore, the cost of governments' contribution to capital formation will 
also increase. 
8In Pakistan, the central and the provincial Governments did raise the rate of interests to 4 and 
4,50 per cent respectively on new issues after the rise in the bank rate. 
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The Dangers of Monetary Policy 
in Agrarian Economies 
Richard C. Porter 
The central banks of underdeveloped economies are frequently ad-
monished for their apparently permissive attitude towards inflation. Where 
large government deficits are financed by the creation of ever-larger money 
balances in the economy, this criticism is quite apt. But the strictures often 
extend to those central banks which, in a situation where prices have already 
risen for reasons beyond their control1, are reluctant to refuse the accom-
modating expansion of the money supply. With t h e argument that t h e 
central bank can force prices back to their previous levels merely by insisting 
that the money supply does not increase, central bankers and their supporters 
have seldom disagreed. They justify permissive after-the-fact monetary 
expansions on the grounds that driving the price level back down would 
have unfortunate side effects2. 
lFor example, as a result of crop failures a rise in urban wages, or an unexpected shift in the 
terms of trade. 
2As, for example, inequities or temporary idle capacity. 
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first. I11 Section II, it is assumed that all wealth balances, in each of the two 
sectors, are held in the form of money—foodgrains are never hoarded. It 
will be shown that traditional monetary policy is effective5. In Section III, 
the assumption that agriculturalists hold some portion of their real-wealth 
balances in the form of hoarded foodgrains is introduced. Monetary policy 
is shown to be uncertain, if not totally ineffective, under these conditions. 
II 
In this agrarian economy, there are only two types of people who may 
be conveniently huddled together and prosaically labelled agriculturalists 
and nonagriculturalists. The agricultural sector produces foodgrains in an 
amount that may vary as a result of such factors as the caprice of nature 
but that is unaffected by economic considerations. The government levies 
an unchan ging lump-sum tax in money terms upon this sector6. This tax is 
transferred by that government entirely to the nonagricultural sector whose 
members produce nothing7. Thus, the real income of tlic agriculturalists is 
their foedgrains production less the real value of their taxes (i.e., the money 
value of the taxes divided by the price of foodgrains), and the real income of 
the nonagriculturalists is this real value of the taxes upon the agricultural 
sector. 
The government has incurred budget deficits at some time in the past, 
for there is a stock of money in the economy, divided between the two sectors 
and being the entire wealth of these sector8. Foodgrain consumption and 
real-wealth holding are the only economic goods in this economy; hence, 
for each sector we can visualize a demand curve for foodgrains which de-
pends upon real income and real wealth of that sector9. An increase in 
either real income or real wealth of a sector will increase its demand for 
foodgrain consumption 
5By "effective" is meant merely that 1) for any money supply only one price-level equilibrium 
can be maintained by the economy, and 2) the larger the money supply the higher is that price level. 
Implicit is the third assumption that the equilibrium is stable and that the effects of disequilibrating shocks 
disappear rapidly. 
6None of the conclusions would be altered if the tax were fixed in real terms, i.e., so much food-
grains rather than so many units of currency. 
7Except perhaps "social goods". This sector comprises all landlords, civil servants, police, pri-
ests, magistrates, soldiers, etc. 
SThere is no national wealth; in the strict sense, this money is merely internal debt. That it is 
generally, though illusorily, considered unencumbered wealth is well known. 
fThere is also a demand curve for real wealth which depends upon real income and foodgrain 
consumption. This we neglect because, by the budget constraint, whatever real income is not devoted 
to foodgrain consumption must become demand for augmented real-wealth balances (and any excess of 
consumption over real income is demand for diminished real balances). 
lOThe marginal propensity to consume (foodgrains) out of real income will be less than unity. 
In the present context, this follows from the fact that real wealth is assumed not to be an inferior good. 
An increase in real income increases both desired consumption flows and desired wealth balances; this 
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declines chronologically in the agricultural sector. Slowly but inevitably 
the monetization ofrural wealth proceeds. This process cannot be hurried— 
if a government pushes too much money into the economy, relying on a 
rapidly increased rural willingness to substitute money for other wealth 
forms, it will learn from the ensuing inflation that this process of monetiz-
ation cannot be hastily accelerated. 
This process may not be forced, but it may be at least temporarily 
reversed. Farmers may always be willing, if circumstances warrant, to hold 
a smaller fraction of their wealth as money. The inexorable monetization 
of the countryside cannot be halted but it can be temporarily retarded. 
When a farmer has only recently begun to hold as large a portion of his 
wealth in money as he presently does, the desire cannot yet be too deeply 
implanted; and if, to restore that portion in money, he must sell his crop at 
declining prices, he may quite readily "regress" to a larger fraction of food-
grain wealth. 
If this in fact occurs, t h e implications for monetary policy are enor-
mous. I t s entire basis disappears once the farmer is able and willing to 
produce a money substitute. Consider now the price implications of a 
temporary crop failure. When foodgrain production falls, prices rise; 
when production recovers, the real-wealth balances of the agricultural 
sector become inadequate. But the farmer merely stockpiles foodgrains 
until his wealth holdings are adequate. As long as the price level does not 
fall, the real-wealth balances of the nonagricultural sector are adequate, 
since the recovery of foodgrain production does not affect its real income 
(unless prices fall). 
There are, therefore, two extreme possibilities concerning prices when 
foodgrain output recovers from a temporary fall (always assuming unchanged 
tax-and-transfers and money supply). The first is that there will be no 
change in rural foodgrain hoards and prices will decline to their previous 
level (as in Section II, when no foodgrain hoards were held). The second 
is that any inadequacy of rural real-wealth balances will be entirely satisfied 
by accumulation of foodgrain hoards with no decline at all in prices. There 
is a strong likelihood that reality will be more closely described by the latter. 
If the government persists in its belief that the rise in foodgrain prices 
is temporary, since it was occasioned by a temporary fall in output, its error 
will only gradually become apparent. For prices will not decline. While 
pursued, however, a policy of "monetary restriction" (i.e., no change in 
taxes or money supply) will have two serious effects upon the economy: 
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rise in p, no increase in SA need occur and no change in CA or CB need take 
place. If p rises (because of a temporary fall in X) and the government 
wishes no change in the real variable of the system, one way to achieve this 
is to raise M and T proportionately. It may be the only way to prevent a 
rise in the equilibrium amount of SA and CA and a fall in that of CB (with 
an additional temporary loss of consumption, while the larger SA is being 
accumulated). 
A Comment 
Hugh T. Patrick and Lester V. Chandler* 
In his interesting article, Richard C. Porter presents a model "to show 
that, in agrarian (or predominantly agricultural) economies it may be 
impossible to counteract apparently temporary shifts in the price level by 
means of traditional monetary policy". In Section III, to which this com-
ment relates, he assumes a two-sector model, with one sector (agriculture) 
producing the single commodity (foodstuffs) in the economy and the other 
sector living on lump-sum transfer payments from the agricultural sector 
and producing nothing. These lump-sum taxes are fixed and in money 
form; Porter assumes (incorrectly, as is discussed below) that "none of the 
conclusions would be altered if the tax were fixed in real terms" (footnote on 
p. 227). Output is independent of economic considerations (determined by 
the "caprice of nature"). A fixed money supply is given, as is a desire to 
hold a certain real-wealth balance relative to real income and consumption. 
Speculation on the basis of expectations of price changes is assumed away. 
The nonagricultural sector holds its real wealth only in the form of money, 
while the agricultural sector holds both money and hoards of foodgrains. 
While Porter grants that we know almost nothing about "what causes 
changes (and by how much) in the relative proportions of foodgrain stocks 
*Dr, Patrick, Assistant Professor of Economics at Yale University, and Dr. Chandler, Professor of 
Economics at Princeton University, were visiting Professors at the University of Bombay (India) during 
1961/62. 
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farmer lias, or thinks he has, any influence on price through his sales1. 
Moreover, he explicitly rules out expectational effects. Thus, farmers will 
not regard their own sales as reducing the price of foodstuffs. W h y , then, 
will they cease to market their output? Porter granted earlier in his article 
that there is no economic difference between foodstuffs and money. When 
the farmer sells his output he obtains a lower price than had existed earlier 
(when output had declined), but by the same token the money he receives 
in exchange is worth more in terms of foodgrains. The opportunity cost 
of each (money and foodstuffs) is the other. From the viewpoint of the 
individual farmer who cannot influence price, his real wealth is the same in 
either case. Unless the farmer is irrational or has some peculiar illusion 
about the effect of the composition of his real wealth 011 its total amount, 
there seems to be no a priori reason why the farmer should behave in the 
manner Porter suggests to hold more of his wealth in foodgrains and less 
in money. 
The outcome envisaged by Porter becomes 110 more likely when 
expectations are taken into consideration. He might have argued, though 
he did not, that farmers would withhold supplies at any price below the 
peak reached after the crop failure because that peak price had come to be 
considered "normal", any drop below which would be expected to be 
followed later by a price rise, which would make money an inferior means 
of storing wealth. There could indeed be such a "reservation price", some-
what analogous to the Keyncsian liquidity trap. But surely this would be at 
some level that was low by historical standards, not at or near the highest 
level attained in recent history. Price declines from the highest levels 
recently experienced are just as likely, if not more likely, to create expect-
ations of further declines which would counsel holding a larger rather than 
a smaller fraction of wealth in the form of money. 
Thus, Porter has not provided plausible reasons why it is "very 
likely", or even likely at all, that farmers will not market foodstuffs as prices 
llf he docs implicitly assume the existence of monopoly elements in agriculture, his analysis 
would have to be modified considerably. Under this condition, it would be rational for monopoly farmers 
to withhold output by raising the fraction of foodstuffs in their total wealth in order to prevent a price de-
cline, but for a reason that Porter does not specify. The lump-sum tax is in money form; the real income 
of the farmer is reduced if the price of foodstuffs declines, since the money tax transferred to the non-
agricultural sector has a higher purchasing power. The logical conclusion would be for the farmers to 
band together and withhold virtually all of their output so that the price would rise to its maximum limit. 
This limit in theory would be infinity, but this price would kill off all the nonagricultural population. 
For political reasons perhaps the maximum limit would approach that sufficient to provide just, enough 
foodstuffs to the nonagricultural sector for subsistence with zero wealth balances. Thus, in a monopoly 
situation with lump-sum money taxes the farmers logically would not only want to maintain a certain 
high price level (derived from the previous decline in output) but would want to push the price as high as 
possible, subject to noneconomic constraints (humanitarianism, revolt by the nonagricultural sector, 
government interference, raised taxes, etc.). While the proportion of money in their real wealth would 
likely decline, its real wealth would be sufficiently high that the agricultural sector would hold a larger 
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wealth balances, how can we remedy the other results? 
The decrease in real consumption within the period of adjustment is 
necessary because the increase in foodstuff hoarding is real saving. There 
arc two alternatives: to eliminate the real saving and thereby restore con-
sumption to its original level for all periods; or to shift (some or all o f ) the 
burden of decreased real consumption to the agricultural sector from the 
nonagricultural sector. The first alternative can be met, if farmers persist 
in holding larger stocks of foodgrains relative to their real income, by forc-
ing down their absolute level of foodstuff hoards to its former position by 
using taxation to lower agricultural real income below its former level and 
then to keep it at the lower level. A mere restoration of the former dis-
tribution of real income between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors 
would not lead farmers to lower their stocks of foodgrains to the old level, 
if the second alternative is decided upon, taxation can reduce farmers' real 
income below its previous level initially enough so that their increase in 
foodstuff hoards would be just compensated by decreases in their own con 
sumption. Eventually the desired level of foodstuff hoards is reached and 
taxation can be relaxed enough to allow the farmers their initial level of 
real income. 
Suppose the authorities are unwilling to tax farmers heavily enough 
to force a reduction of farmers' holdings of foodgrains to the old level and 
instead aim only at restoring the real income of the nonagricultural sector. 
There are at least two ways of doing this: 1) leave the nominal money 
supply constant, accept the higher price level resulting from the decrease in 
the farmers' demand for real-money balances, raise money taxes enough to 
compensate for the rise in prices and transfer these taxes to the nonagricul-
tural sector; 2) levy on the farmers a "once-only" tax equal to the original 
decrease in the farmers' demand for money balances and destroy this money. 
With equal decreases in the demand for and supply of money, 
prices will fall back to their original level after farmers have raised their 
stocks of foodstuffs to the desired level and again offer for sale the old 
fraction of their output. Of the two methods, we prefer the second 
which, in addition to restoring the initial income distribution, would also 
restore the initial price level. Admittedly, this will not necessarily induce 
farmers to return to holding only the former fraction of their wealth in the 
form of money. But we think Porter's prescription of increasing the 
nominal money supply in proportion to the initial price increase would 
be even less successful, for it would almost surely lead to still further price 
increases. It is suggested that price stability is not only compatible with 
monetization of the economy but is indeed most conducive to it. Upward 
ratchet-type price movements may eventually induce a flight from money 
into real inventories and tend to demonetize the economy. 
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the use of several lagged priccs fails to improve regressions; just last year's 
price is sufficient to explain almost the entirety of any response to price 
[1 ; 2, Chapter 4]. Thus, last year's high price becomes this year's expected 
price; but more important, it becomes this year's concept of a "normal" 
price. 
3) Farmers hold wealth primarily as a precaution against crop 
calamities. When one farmer's crop fails, so also will many ofhis neighbour's 
crops and high food prices are likely to prevail in the region. Thus, his 
money will be used to purchase food at (what he considers) normal or above-
normal prices, and he will not be anxious to acquire money if it requires 
selling food at (what he considers) below-normal prices. 
Primarily for these reasons, I do not believe farmers would be willing 
to maintain the money-fraction of their wealth in the face of prices which 
are falling below "normal" levels. 
If this critical assumption is accepted, everything else follows; if not, 
none of it follows. Whether one accepts or rejects it depends upon one's 
view of the way the world operates. The assumption is patently an 
empirical guess. The assumption I chose may be empirically inaccurate, 
but it is not logically incorrect (as Messrs. Patrick and Chandler seem to 
imply). For example, there is nothing "strange" in the fact that the 
rate of monetization cannot be accelerated by rising prices but can be tempo-
rarily reversed by falling prices, i.e., what Messrs. Patrick and Chandler 
call "an infinite elasticity of substitution in agricultural wealth balances 
at one price level and not at another". It is no more "strange" than 
the traditional statement about monetary policy being like pulling or pushing 
011 a string. In the short run especially, we can find many such asymmetries 
in the world. 
1 agree that rising prices seem "hardly conducive to monetization of 
the agricultural sector". But the world has long experienced simul-
taneously gradual inflation and gradual monetization. Our historical 
experience is that price stability is neither necessary nor sufficient for nionetiz-
ation. In any case, I was not advocating rising prices; rather I was suggest-
ing that it might be impossible to reverse a price rise that had unfortunately 
already occurred. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In discussions of the economic problems of underdeveloped countries, 
the thinking of layman and of professional economists often diverges widely. 
Nowhere is this disagreement more patent than in the case of food pro-
duction and its effects upon the price level. In government agencies, news-
papers and public discussions, the view that bad crops "cause" inflation is 
ubiquitous, while economists are usually quick to point out the difference 
between movements in relative prices and the general price level. 
The economists' view is sophisticated and requires elaboration. For 
nearly a century, there has been a division of economic problems into two 
basic categories: those concerned with the value and production of particular 
commodities relative to other commodities; and those concerned with the 
total production of an economy and the general price level of the output. 
There is now an extensive theory of the effect of a decline in the output of a 
commodity (e.g., food) upon its price. Under most conditions, one can safely 
predict that an autonomous1 reduction in the output of food will induce a 
lAn "autonomous" or "exogenous" movement merely means that it is not capable of economic 
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the expense of an unfavourable turn in the foreign balance on current 
account. Abstracting from the extraneous shocks to which Pakistan's 
foreign trade seems particularly prone, we may conclude that the only clear 
effect of crop failure upon the balance of payments will be to raise imports 
to the extent that the government chooses to alleviate the high food prices. 
But this is more a dilemma than a choice: higher imports this year may 
reduce the rise in food prices, but the resulting lower imports next year (to 
restore foreign-exchange holdings) increase the likelihood that the price 
rise will be permanent18. 
IV 
The governments' (central and provincial) budgetary position is 
certainly not unaffected by the country's food position. Unfortunately, 
the effects cannot be seen from historical analysis because the years of bad 
crops in Pakistan have always been years of other unusual circumstances. 
But a priori thinking suffices to indicate that at such times tax revenues will 
not increase and the government's expenditures will not decline — from 
inadequate food supplies may follow both physical pain and fiscal grief. 
The only source of government revenue that might increase when 
crops fail is the personal income tax19, for the relatively rich (the only ones 
who pay such taxes) are most probably the sole gainers from the rise in 
food prices (Section I). Corporate profits and net revenues from govern-
ment enterprise will not rise and may decline (Section II). For the same 
reasons, those goods which carry sales and excise taxes will not sell either in 
greater quantity or at higher price. Land revenues can only decline through 
suspensions and remissions in particularly distressed farm regions. Finally, 
taxes on exports will also fall, even if export earnings should rise, inasmuch as 
such taxes are generally applied per quantity to agricultural exports; the 
volume of jute and cotton produced will be reduced by the very factors 
which damaged food crops (Section I). The tendency is surely towards a 
decline in government revenues. 
Presumably, the government's expenditures are much less variable 
than its revenues, once the budget has been established. While this has, in 
fact, proven to be true over the 1950's in Pakistan [14] nevertheless expendi-
tures have often deviated substantially from budgeted estimates. To the 
extent that the government is food buyer domestically, it has not purchased 
at market prices and, hence, its expenditures here are insulated from the food-
price increases during poor crop years. But price rises (or increased shor-
18As will be seen in Section VII. 
19And, for the same reasons, the agricultural income tax; but this latter is a very minor source of 
revenue. 
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the money supply will there be seen to be much clearer than the immediate 
effects. 
V 
So far, the analysis has been of the initial reactions of the economy to 
a decline in food production. In the remainder of this paper, we shall be 
concerned with the secondary reactions, namely, those which begin to occur 
some time after the bad food crop. And the basic question is: what are the 
irreversible changes caused by the bad crop (such that a subsequent normal 
or above-normal crop cannot return the economy to its original state) ? 
The wage structure is the most critical place where such irreversible 
changes may occur. In most underdeveloped and underemployed econo-
mies, the wage of basic, unskilled jobs is determined to only a slight degree 
by the strictly economic forces of supply and demand. The " f loor" wage 
(possibly a truly subsistence wage) is a political and sociological affair. To 
the extent that workers have political influence and that public philosophy 
is concerned with the welfare of the working class, rises in the cost of living 
will be translated, belatedly and perhaps incompletely, into rises in wages. 
H o w belated and how incomplete is this relationship is an empirical question. 
The level of money wages is an outstanding example of irreversibility 
in Pakistan although the reasons for this attribute are clearly not the same 
as in more successfully unionized economies. A rise in wages, once achieved 
through this socio-political process, is almost impossible to reverse — this is 
undoubtedly the reason why "pay commissions" generally delay, not decide, 
especially in the face of price movements which the government still hopes 
to reverse. If the rise in food prices in one year leads to any rise in wages in 
the succeeding years (even if all other influences return to their previous 
"normal" states), the economy can avoid, only with great difficulty, a per-
manently higher price level. 
In Pakistan, the ability of workers to maintain real wages in the face 
of extensive price rises is not fully recognized. It is often said that money 
wages have remained nearly constant during the 1950's22 while, in fact, real 
wages have remained far more stable. In Karachi, the index of money 
wages rose by 48 per cent over 1952-60 and 21 per cent over 1955-60, 
while the index of real wages increased by 18 per cent over 1952-60 and 
remained the same over 1955-60 [4, Appendix A]. It is impossible to 
deny, for Karachi at least, the closeness of the movements of cost of living 
and money wages over the past ten years. 
22F 0 r example, the Second Fife-Year Plan commits this error: "In fact, the average money wage 
rate seems to have stood constant around Rs. 1,000 per annum in recent years" [10, p. 60]. 
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This is more than just a high income elasticity for semi-durable 
manufactured goods. There is a back-logged demand which will probably 
be satisfied even though it means an expenditure elasticity for such items 
greater than that of two years ago (i.e., before the bad crop). Even if real 
income rises this year to its level of two years ago, food consumption will 
probably not rise immediately to its previous level but will remain somewhat 
depressed (relative to two years ago but not, of course, the last year) in order 
to permit satisfaction of accumulated demands for semi-durable manufac-
tures. 
Were other factors conveniently to remain equal (to two years ago), 
we should, therefore, expect food prices to be now below those prevailing 
with the same-size crop two years ago. Other factors, however, will not 
have remained equal. Some groups gained during the bad crop year and 
have probably expanded their demand, at least temporarily, for food as well 
as other items. Workers' wages will be higher now. And there are other 
forces, still to be discussed, which either expand aggregate (and hence food) 
demand or increase the scarcity (or price) of goods substitutable to food. A 
ceteris paribus prediction of a lower (than two years ago) food price in the year 
following bad crops would be a dangerous one. 
Far less dangerous is the conclusion that demand for manufactured 
items on the part of low-income groups will be abnormally high in the year 
following a food crop failure. B u t low-income groups contribute only a 
portion of the demand for manufactured goods; before making assertions 
about the total demand for such items, we should look at the demand of 
those with higher incomes. These can conveniently be divided into two 
groups for present purposes: 1) high-income farmers and certain landlords, 
middlemen, etc., whose real incomes rose in the year of bad crops; and 2) 
high-income urban groups whose incomes suffered either slightly (because 
their food consumption was low relative to their unchanged incomes) or 
significantly (because their incomes were derived from the lower profits of 
manufacturing) in the bad crop year. 
For both of these high-income groups, the consumption analysis of 
developed economies is probably applicable. A generally accepted pro-
position resulting from both theoretical and econometric work is that a 
consumer will alter his total consumption only gradually in the face of 
changes in his income. Furthermore, the pattern of his consumption will 
be altered only gradually as relative prices change. For these reasons, it is 
unlikely that serious change in consumption, either the total or the composit-
ion, will take place among high-income groups either in the year of bad 
crops or the following year. There will be slight increases in consumption 
by the high-income gainers and slight decreases by the losers. 
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an exceptionally good year will occur eventually and reverse this loss, but 
few governments in underdeveloped economies can afford the risk involved 
in waiting for nature to repay her debt. There are ways to avoid an import 
contraction — the links are not inseparable. But where it is not avoided, it 
is another irreversible legacy of crop failure. 
The reduction in imports may take place in luxury consumption 
items. This will at least partially lead to a reallocation of export bonus 
vouchers in this direction; the extent of such reallocation will depend upon 
the behaviour of high-income groups in the face of gains and losses during 
the bad crop year (see Section IV). Probably the reduction of availability of 
imported manufactured items for consumption would add somewhat to 
the demand for domestic manufactures. But such a conclusion is tenuous, 
for the two are far from perfect substitutes and may not be considered sub-
stitutes at all by many people. 
The reduction of industrial imports, whether equipment or material, 
poses a frightening dilemma for government. Most Pakistani businessmen 
have shown great willingness to reinvest profits in capital equipment, but 
to ask them to wait longer for the requisite import licences is to invite them 
to consume their profits. To reduce raw-material imports means under-
utilization of already-imported scarce capital. Thus, if industrial imports 
are reduced, it is likely to cause: 1) a rise in demand for luxury consumption, 
domestic and foreign; and 2) a rise in the prices of industrial raw materials. 
The implications of the first have been discussed in the preceding section: 
new import constraints will probably further an already extent rise in de-
mand for domestic manufactures. The second effect will be treated in the 
next section. 
VIII 
In Pakistan, domestic industrial prices have been determined much 
less by economic forces than by law and custom. During the 1950's, it has 
been considered anti-social, if not illegal, to raise price merely because of 
increased demand or inadequate supply. Thus, manufacturers are reluc-
tant to alter prices in order overtly to augment profits23. Only when costs 
have risen, is there justification for a price rise; moreover, price increases are 
often requested, granted and executed following a rise in costs quite 
irrespective of the demand for the product. Of course, in an economy 
where excess demand exists for a great many products, demand need not be 
too carefully considered. 
23Witness the events following decontrol of cloth prices. Even the mill-owners seemed to share 
the popular belief that decontrol would (or shoud) encourage greater output with no rise in prices. In-
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substitute for money, namely, foodgrains. Cereal balances are as good a 
reserve as cash balances and may be increasingly used if the money supply 
does not expand33. In a developing economy, it is certainly monetization 
and not its opposite that the central bank must encourage. It is probably 
true that inflation discourages monetization; it is certainly true that lack of 
money discourages it. 
Keynes discovered that in developed economies there were substitute 
liquid assets to money and that their prices (and yields) could seriously 
affect the velocity of money (or desired real-money balances). While the 
substitute assets are different in an underdeveloped economy, faith in a 
constant income velocity of money is liable to equally great disillusionment. 
X 
Inasmuch as the money supply c a n easily grow to meet the higher 
(after-price rises) cash-balance demands of the public, there is no need to argue 
that velocity (equilibrium or not) rises with the higher prices. The new, 
irreversibly higher price level can just as easily, and more plausibly, be 
maintained by means of an expanded money supply. The crops fail and 
then return to normal—but their legacy remains, a chain of reactions which 
lead to a permanently higher price level in the economy. If crop failure is a 
periodically recurring phenomenon, o n e price push may still be working its 
effects when the next is begun. The demand-inflation possibilities of over-
ambitious investment plans not only may exist simultaneously with crop-
push inflation, but may even be induced by it as the Government seeks 
desperately to avoid a decline in the real size of its expenditure (while being 
unable to increase tax revenues). 
Some of the relationships discussed in this paper are no more than 
hypotheses and speculations. Empirical work is required to verify their 
existence and estimate their quantitative importance. Such investigation will 
be made difficult and tenuous by the entangled economic past of Pakistan— 
the separation of the effects of bad crops from those of the collapse of t h e 
Korean boom, the Plans, and the devaluation may prove impossible. It is 
hoped that these suggestions are of value in themselves, but they depend 
ultimately upon factual knowledge. 
The lesson of this paper is, however, clear even if some of the hypo-
thesized relationships are unsure as to existence or importance. Stabilization 
of food prices is a prerequisite to price stabilization. It is certainly a necessary 
condition, and very probably a sufficient condition as well. Adequate stocks 
33For a full discussion of this possibility, see [12]. 
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